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The Religious Freedom Peace Thesis (RFPT) suggests that societies may reduce political 
violence by fully respecting individuals’ rights to live their faiths according to the dictates of 
their convictions, but little empirical evidence supports this contention.  I redress this evidentiary 
lacuna by subjecting the RFPT to empirical examination.  First though, I attempt to refine the 
RFPT by proposing a conditional model of political violence that turns to John Locke’s seminal 
works on religious toleration to link competing approaches to religion and violence, including 
the so-called “clash of civilizations” and an under-theorized empirical phenomenon described as 
the “diversity dividend.”  The neo-Lockean variant of the RFPT contends that the effects of 
religious diversity on political violence—domestic terrorism, to be more specific—are 
conditioned by a regime’s church-state relationship.  As such, I examine the possibility that 
religious heterogeneity drives terrorism under conditions of religious non-freedom.  Since the 
neo-Lockean model is a Western-centric approach to political violence contingent upon Western 
values (i.e., religious freedom) though, I subject several hypotheses drawn from the RFPT to a 
battery of statistical analyses intentionally using data drawn from the non-Western world: 
namely, Asia and Africa from 2000-2009.  I ultimately find no empirical support for the RFPT 
(even its more sophisticated neo-Lockean variant), and while this may stem from limitations in 
the data, it opens current religious freedom research to critical evaluation, particularly regarding 
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1 | Introduction 
 
Like any other morning at the daycare, children in fresh from drop off were probably at 
play, their laughter hanging in the air, itself pregnant with the possibilities of their futures.  It 
was, of course, just another ordinary Wednesday in Oklahoma City—at least until it wasn’t.  At 
9:02 AM, Timothy McVeigh detonated the 4800 lb. explosive device he and Terry Nichols 
planted in a Ryder moving truck parked outside of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.  The 
structure’s façade collapsed, resulting in 168 deaths and another 650 injuries (Durham 1996; 
Smith 2015; Walsh 2008).  Nineteen of the twenty-five children in the second-floor daycare also 
died, including Baylee Amon, an infant whose death in the arms of fire-fighter Chris Fields was 
immortalized in a haunting and heart-wrenching photograph that would later be awarded the 
Pulitzer Prize.
1
  To this day, the episode stands out as the most destructive instance of domestic 
terrorism ever to take place on American soil, and its violence has only been surpassed by the 
terror attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11).  McVeigh’s stated aim was to avenge the Branch 
Davidians after a Federal government siege on their Waco, Texas compound resulted in the 
deaths of 83 men, women, and children exactly two-years earlier.  While the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tabaco, and Fire Arms (ATF) may point to allegations of child abuse and weapons stockpiling as 
the impetus for the siege, some of the Branch Davidians see the standoff as the culmination of 
years of religious persecution.  McVeigh might agree, but none of Davidians hold any sympathy 
for the man who was executed for his role in the 19 April 1995 bombing.  Rather, survivors of 
the 1993 assault erected a headstone at the Waco compound to memorialize McVeigh’s victims 




Some twenty years later, and nearly 5000 miles away, another terrorist attack would 
result in the deaths of 130 Parisians.  In a climate of anti-Islamic sentiment, the series of 
bombings and shootings that broke out on 13 November 2015 were initially believed by some to 
be the work of Syrian refugees.  In reality, several recently radicalized French and Belgian 
nationals were behind the homegrown
2
 plot (Guo 2015; Richards 2015), but facts aside, the 
events of that fateful Paris night would add fuel to the fire of nativist Islamophobia in both 
Europe and the United States of America (U.S.).  For example, the then-improbable
3
 Republican 
nominee for president, Donald J. Trump, issued a series of venomous statements leveled at the 
American Muslim community and the wider world of Islam in response to the Paris attacks.  
Trump, the billionaire businessman whose candidacy for president has revealed him to be a 
staunch xenophobe, said he would shutter American mosques (Krieg 2015), called for a database 
of Muslim citizens (Diamond 2015a), and said he would also consider surveilling any mosques 
not slated for closure (Mark and Diamond 2015).  Shortly thereafter, in response to the 
December 2 shootings in San Bernadino, California, Trump even called for a ban on all Muslim 
immigration to the U.S., suggesting that Muslims would be prohibited from entering the nation 
until “our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on” (Diamond 2015b).  The 
vacuity of Trump’s statement notwithstanding, that his rhetoric is clearly meant to play on 
nativist fears should come as no surprise.  Fear of the outsider, after all, is a basic component of 
human nature as old as civilization itself (if not older),
4
 and terrorism often contributes to 
political intolerance (Peffley, et al. 2015) while eroding support for democratic norms (Merolla 
and Zechmeister 2009).  Yet, Trump’s draconian proposals should be taken seriously, for they 
smack of the same kind of religious persecution as that perceived to be experienced by the 




In other words, the commonality that unites these two disparate instances of domestic 
terrorism, despite their distance in time and space, is a concern with religious persecution.  In the 
case of the Oklahoma City Bombing, grievances were at play, hinting at the causal implications 
of religious persecution.  In Trump’s case, counterterrorism takes on the greatest salience as 
politicians and publics work out a response to perceived episodes of religiously motivated 
violence.  Together therefore, these cases point to two questions, one empirical and one 
normative.  Is terrorism related to religious persecution?  How should states respond to religious 
violence?    A growing body of scholarly research, described by diplomatic historian Andrew 
Preston (2013) as “a faith-inflected version of democratic peace theory,” would see these 
questions as intimately linked.  Scholars, such as Thomas Farr (2008), who served as the first 
director for the U.S. Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom, might 
answer the first question affirmatively, while responding to the second with two words: religious 
freedom.  That is, these scholars have articulated a simple theory, what I describe as the 
Religious Freedom Peace Thesis (RFPT), which sees religious oppression and regulation as one 
of the primary drivers of all kinds of political violence.  For instance, Brian J. Grim and Roger 
Finke (2011) link increased restrictions on religious activity with increased instances of hate 
crime, terrorism, and even war.  In some respects, it thus seems as if the RFPT treats religious 
freedom as a panacea for many of the world’s problems, but empirical research on the efficacy of 
religious freedom policy is lacking,
5
 making it difficult to evaluate the validity these claims.  
There is anecdotal support for the RFPT though.  By trying to understand the motives of 
some terrorist organizations the connection between the empirical and normative questions 
seems quite apparent.  That is, the real-world implications of Trump’s proposals, for instance, 




the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) insurgency are hopeful that the West will respond to 
acts of terrorism in exactly this way.  As several media outlets, including The Washington Post 
(Guo 2015), The Nation (Editorial 2015), and Newsweek (Gude 2015b) to name only three, have 
reported, Islamophobia plays right into ISIS’s larger narrative and global strategy.  ISIS 
perceives its conflict with the West in absolute terms; theirs is a black and white worldview that 
divides the world between two camps: the camp of Islam, and the camp of the Crusaders.  There 
is also a third—the “gray zone”—but ISIS’s goal is the eradication of this camp.  Gray 
Muslims—moderates, in Western parlance—are said to include all those confused Muslims and 
apostates that have tried to adopt a position of neutrality in the Salafi war against the West.
6
  
ISIS’s hope is that by provoking governments to overreact against Western Muslims in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack, the alienated Muslims of the gray zone will be forced to pick 
sides, essentially tricking the West into destroying the gray zone on ISIS’ behalf (Gude 2015a).  
As argued in Dabiq, the ISIS propaganda rag, operations carried out by the mujahidin against the 
West are meant to “[compel] the crusaders to actively destroy the grayzone themselves, the zone 
in which many of the hypocrites and deviant innovators living in the West are hiding” (ISIS 
2015).  In other words, ISIS actually intends the anti-Islamic backlash championed in the West 
by politicians like Trump to radicalize moderate Muslims, to inspire them to carry out 
homegrown terror attacks in the West as happened in Paris, and ultimately to trigger a real life 
“clash of civilizations” (Gude 2015a-b; also see Huntington 1993a, 1996). 
Trump’s proposals thus stand at odds with the tenets of the religious freedom research 
agenda, and if the RFPT is right, he could give organizations like ISIS exactly what they want.  
With so much at stake in the debate over a proper response to religious violence, this thesis 




examination.  However, I attempt to further develop the RFPT by proposing a conditional model 
of political violence that turns to John Locke’s (1667; 1689) seminal works on religious 
toleration.  Doing so allows me to link different approaches to religion
7
 and violence, including 
the so-called “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993a, 1996) and an under-theorized empirical 
phenomenon described by Dan G. Cox, John Falconer, and Brian Stackhouse (2009; hereinafter 
CFS) as the “diversity dividend.”  This neo-Lockean variant of the RFPT contends that the 
effects of religious diversity on political violence—domestic terrorism, to be more specific—are 
conditioned by a regime’s church-state relationship.  As such, I examine the possibility that 
religious heterogeneity could lead to a clash-of-civilizations-style spike in terrorism under 
conditions of religious non-freedom.  Religious freedom, by comparison, should ameliorate such 
violence as the proponents of the RFPT might suggest.  Resultantly, by drawing on recent 
research on international religious freedom (e.g. Farr 2008; Grim and Finke 2011), this neo-
Lockean model of political violence may be able to reconcile the expectations of Samuel 
Huntington’s (1993a, 1996) “clash of civilizations” thesis with contradictory findings that point 
to the stabilizing effect of religious (and possibly also ethnic) diversity (Cox 2015). 
Several hypotheses stem from this model, and since it is a Western-developed model 
dealing with a Western value (i.e., religious freedom), I subject these hypotheses to a battery of 
statistical analyses intentionally using data drawn from the non-Western world.  In doing so, I 
also follow CFS (2009) by empirically examining Cox’s (2015) claim that the RFPT can account 
for his and his colleague’s discovery of the diversity dividend by turning to a similar universe of 
cases.  Their original analysis, that is, also focused on Asia and Africa.  However, I ultimately 




may result from the limitations of the data, but it nevertheless opens current religious freedom 
research to critical evaluation, particularly regarding its imperialistic implications. 
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I will lay the groundwork for this thesis to 
explore the relationship between religious freedom and domestic terrorism in greater depth.  In 
the next section, I disentangle the various forms of political violence associated with the RFPT, 
laying all but domestic terrorism aside.  I return to the subject of religious violence thereafter; 
then I explore the importance of social, political, and economic context to religious violence in 
the subsequent section.  These two sections are important in that they introduce competing views 
of religion and violence.  An overview of the thesis concludes the chapter. 
The RFPT and Political Terror 
Although religious freedom may not effectively mitigate domestic terrorism, the RFPT 
treats religious freedom as a possible solution for all kinds of religious and political violence (as 
noted above).  But religious and political violence come in many forms, each of which may be 
influenced by a unique data generating process, making it particularly important to disaggregate 
and disambiguate one from another.  Unfortunately, one of the only empirical studies to link 
religious freedom with political violence aggregates hate crimes with terrorism and war (Girm 
and Finke 2011).  Grim and Finke (2011) compare average legal restrictions on religious groups 
to average levels of violence, and find that the two are strongly correlated, but it’s unclear why 
hate crime, terrorism, and war would be lumped together in such a way.  David Muchlinksi 
(2014) also finds some evidence for the RFPT, but he focuses exclusively on hate crime—
religiously motivated killings to be more specific.  His study also stands out for linking religious 
violence to regime type, as he finds religiously motivated hate crimes to be most common under 




Cox (2015) suggests that the reduction of terrorism associated with increasing levels of religious 
diversity—the diversity dividend—may provide evidence for Farr’s (2008) theory of religious 
freedom, but this claim is problematic because the number of religions in a society only 
effectively measures diversity, not religious freedom.  Of course, religious freedom and diversity 
are expected to be related, as Grim and Finke (2006) have previously shown, but these are 
conceptually distinct categories, and the latter can only be used to directly test the diversity 
dividend and clash of civilizations thesis.  As such, there is a real need to clarify the relationship 
between religious freedom and terrorism. 
So, if terrorism is different from other forms of political violence like hate crimes and 
warfare, how should it be classified?  CFS (2009) define terrorism as any violent act perpetrated 
by a non-state actor against civilians to influence policy (also see Cox 2005), illustrating that 
useful definitions usually identify the perpetrators of terrorist violence as non-state actors and 
their victims as noncombatants while treating their motives as inherently political in nature (CFS 
2009; also see Enders, Sanders, and Gaibulloev 2011).  There may be additional features worthy 
of note (CFS 2009; Pillar 2001; Schmid and Jongman 2008), and these specific criteria are not 
without controversy,
8
 but since these three elements seem to be the most important, I follow 
Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibulloev (2011: 321) in defining terrorism as “the 
premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against 
noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a 
large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.” 
Domestic terrorism, of course, “has consequences for only the host country, its 
institutions, people, property and policies” (Sandler 2004: 165), which means that the nationality 




(Berkebile 2015).  Yet, scholars have only recently tried to address domestic terror with the same 
vigor as previous research on transnational terrorism (e.g., Choi and Piazza 2016; CFS 2009; 
Klein 2015; Piazza 2011, 2015a-b; Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009).  Unfortunately, this 
may represent a real danger since episodes of domestic terror account for the vast majority of 
terrorist attacks (Berkebile 2015; also see Abadie 2006), and because some scholars worry that 
the threat posed by domestic terror could be growing around the globe (CFS 2009).  As 
illustrated in Figure 1 though, this claim is somewhat difficult to evaluate because the annual 
number of domestic terrorist attacks reported for Asia and Africa in different datasets vary 
wildly.  This sort of confusion signals a need for further research on domestic terrorism, so this 
thesis specifically sets out to evaluate the relationship between religious freedom and domestic 
terror.  Of course, a focus on domestic terrorism is also theoretically important, because it is 
unclear why a religiously aggrieved population might lash out abroad when the religious 
persecution that allegedly motivates its use of violence likely emanates from its home 
governments. 
The Ambivalence of the Sacred? 
Figure 1. The total number of domestic terror attacks suffered by Asian and African states, 2000-2010 Berkebile 




Does the concern with the grievances engendered by religious persecution make certain 
acts of domestic terrorism like the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building special?  Should the 
religious nature of these attacks—in Paris, Oklahoma City, or anywhere else for that matter—be 
treated as consequential to an analysis of domestic terrorism?  Since these are empirical 
questions, the answer is probably yes.  Religiously motivated violence may be different from 
violence motivated by other phenomena, and scholars can compare the two to determine how 
they are different.  However, some research (and polemic) on religious violence attempts to 
assign blame to religion for all kinds of violence a priori (Harris 2004; Maher 2008), by 
assuming that religion is the cause of violence in human affairs rather than just a factor, and by 
assuming that religion always causes violence without acknowledging the positive ways religion 
may contribute to public life. 
Admittedly, major incidents of religiously inspired violence are easy to tally; if pressed 
for an illustration, it would come as no surprise if an individual chosen at random could readily 
point to the Crusades, the Inquisition, or the 9/11 terror attacks.  If challenged to identify an 
example of prosocial religious behavior, however, at least some individuals might be hard 
pressed to think of an example so quickly.  Still, there are many.  For instance, Pope Francis and 
the diplomatic machinery of the Holy See were recently credited for their role in mediating the 
emerging détente between the U.S. and Cuba (Miller and Dias 2014).  Similarly, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Center for Religion and 
Diplomacy (ICRD) frequently pursue faith-based conflict resolution strategies in places as 
diverse as the Balkans, Kashmir, and even Israel (Embree 2003; Gopin 2003; Steele 2003).  In 
the U.S., where Evangelicals are typically known for their conservative social activism, many 




(Bernstein 2010).  Meanwhile, advocates of interfaith dialogue, such as Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf 
(2005) and his Cordoba Initiative, actively work to repair relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims in the West and abroad.  Moderates like Rauf—the gray zone Muslims detested by 
ISIS-affiliated extremists—are even praised as the key to defeating Islamic radicalism and 
winning the war on terror, so their interfaith enterprises have, at least to an extent, received 
support from conservatives and liberals alike (Zakaria 2010). 
Like many human inventions then, religion, as these examples make clear, can contribute 
to the general wellbeing of a society in deep and meaningful ways, even though it may also have 
the capacity to facilitate violence.  R. Scott Applebee (2000) describes this duality as “the 
ambivalence of the sacred,” and suggests that it would be disingenuous to focus on one aspect of 
this apparent binary at the expense of another (also see Eller 2010; Omelicheva 2016).  Doing so 
would “smack of reductionism,” he argues.  Nevertheless, debates over religion and violence do 
exactly this: they overemphasize the actions of those religious actors found on one side while 
minimizing the behavior of competing groups.  For example, primordialist theories of religious 
violence treat religious identity as a major source of tension between rival groups, and as such, 
posit religious differences as the cause of terrorism, ethnic violence, and warfare (Fox and 
Sandler 2004).  Some of the more tempered primordialist approaches, like Huntington’s (1993a, 
1996) clash of civilizations thesis, might come off as agnostic to the prosocial dimension of 
religious belief, but the fact is that he sees religious identity as sowing the seeds of conflict 
precisely because different religious affinities lead to different interests, ultimately precluding 
the possibility of cooperation between different groups (also see Fox and Sandler 2004; 




Huntington’s New Atheist acolytes are more explicit though.  They like to portray 
religion as always and everywhere useless, harmful, or outright violent (e.g., Harris 2004; Maher 
2008; also see Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011).  Rather than ignoring the prosocial contributions 
of modern religious actors the way Huntington does, the New Atheists dismiss them outright.  
For instance, Sam Harris (2004) maintains that there is no such thing as a “moderate” Muslim (or 
a moderate religious actor of any kind for that matter).  Indeed, where Huntington’s former 
student Fareed Zakaria (2010) might call for support of moderates like Rauf, Harris maintains 
that the normative justification for moderation only exists because people irrationally see the 
religious experience as producing some sort of benefit, while they instead treat incarnations of 
religious violence instrumentally.  In other words, Harris opposes the idea that corrupt religious 
actors only behave violently because of their ulterior politico-economic motivations.  Instead, he 
sees them as violent to the core, while non-violent religious actors are only “moderate” because 
they have made a conscious choice to reject theological tenets at odds with modernity.  By 
contrast, comedian Bill Maher (2008), another of Harris’ ilk, concedes that there are benefits to 
religious belief, but with greed, terrorism, homophobia, child abuse, and warfare on his mind, 
Maher argues that these benefits come at too high a cost.  
The New Atheists do have one point that should be taken seriously though.  Those 
perceived as apologists for religion often fail to take seriously the possibility that genuine 
religious beliefs could lead to violence or self-sacrifice (Applebee 2000).  On this point, some 
American conservatives often find themselves in agreement with the intellectual liberals counted 
among the New Atheists.  For example, media personality Glenn Beck (2015) is highly critical 
of attempts by President Barack Obama and liberal think tanks, like the Center for American 




stated that ISIS is not Islamic primarily because the majority of its victims have been Muslims 
(e.g., Obama 2014).  Meanwhile, organizations like CAP tend to point out that violence captures 
the media’s attention more easily than does coexistence, providing a platform for extremists to 
project their vision of religion to the world, despite their status as part of a fringe minority 
(Volsky and Jenkins 2014).  So, while some might criticize the president or his fellow 
progressives of naiveté, other observers (e.g. McKay 2012; Herrington and McKay 2015) have 
pointed out that the New Atheists and American conservatives are less concerned with 
understanding the nature of religion and violence than they are in spewing anti-Islamic polemic.  
Rather than taking both sides of religious ambivalence seriously, they simply prey on the 
public’s anti-Islamic attitudes.  Nevertheless, the president and CAP may legitimately be faulted 
for their failure to acknowledge the possibility that religion can exacerbate or provoke outbursts 
of violent behavior. 
On one hand, theirs is a normative approach that simply seeks to discipline religious 
extremists into conformity with Western sensibilities (Hurd 2015).  On the other hand, they treat 
religion instrumentally, meaning they see religion as a tool used to undergird one’s authority 
over a believing public through the promise of future rewards (Fox and Sandler 2004; Lynch 
2014; Omelicheva 2016).  The president is hardly the only person to treat the phenomenon of 
religiously infused terrorism in this way though.  Robert Pape’s (2006) work on suicide terrorism 
dismisses religious explanations in favor of a strategic logic, but instrumentalist studies such as 
his fall into the same trap by completely divorcing religion from associated forms of violence 
(Lynch 2009).  This is hardly surprising though.  The instrumentalization of religion entails its 
mobilization as a resource directed at achieving one’s true goals, which are usually economic, 




always been capable of functioning as this kind of resource because of the genuinely held beliefs 
of the public.  The instrumentalization of religion may operate, as Mariya Y. Omelicheva (2016: 
145) avers, through a “discursive process of packaging the references to religion with certain 
themes and emotional appeals for the purpose of power legitimization,” but that’s because these 
discursive representations are presented to a public open to such ideas.  Yet, religion can do more 
than legitimize a leader’s authority or agenda.  As Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2004) 
observe, instrumentalists see religion as a valuable asset in the construction and maintenance of 
socio-political order (e.g., Herrington 2012).  In this respect, analyzing an organization like ISIS 
instrumentally makes a lot of sense given its attempts to reestablish the Islamic caliphate.  
Additionally, anyone—a politician, a terrorist, or someone else—can instrumentalize religion, 
particularly in the face of economic decline or state collapse (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003).  
Religion can thus function as a powerful tool for anyone seeking to fill a political void, or for 
anyone seeking to distract a believing public from socio-economic concerns.  As Karl Marx 
(1844) claims, “it [religion] is the opium of the people” (author’s emphasis).  
Since the RFPT posits a contextual explanation for political violence, it falls under the 
rubric of the neo-Weberian approach (Lynch 2009, 2014) to religion in International Relations 
(IR).  Of course, the RFPT does not deny that religion itself may play a causal role in the 
propagation of terrorist violence, and since there is nothing about instrumentalism that is 
necessarily incompatible with primordialism (Fox and Sandler 2004), I suggest that the same is 
true of the neo-Weberian approach.  Even Huntington (2001) acknowledges that “Muslim wars” 
are rooted in instrumentalist concerns with politics, though he argues that they have the potential 
to “congeal” into a clash of civilizations.  Rather than assuming that religion is always and 




assuming that violence only manifests when religion is (ab)used for instrumental reasons, the 
neo-Weberian approach thus tries to take both sides of religious ambivalence seriously.  It 
recognizes that religion can be violent, but that it can also foster prosocial benefits for public life, 
and instead seeks to understand why and when religious actors may behave in one way or the 
other by examining the social, political, and economic contexts in which religious actors may 
operate. 
Why Context Matters 
To understand what’s at stake in this debate over religious violence, and why context 
matters, consider the following two examples.  First, though the more conservative estimate from 
the RDWTI (2016) indicates that Uganda has suffered only 63 terror attacks since the 1970s, it 
may have experienced as many as 350 since 1970 (Berkebile 2015; START 2016).  Several 
hundred of those attacks have been attributed to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Christian 
extremist organization with roots in the poorly educated Catholic protest movements of the rural 
north.  CFS (2009, 184-187) rightly treat the LRA as a continuation of past violence, but act 
surprised at its nasty legacy because their assumption that Uganda has long been free from 
“political struggle between rival groups” is based on an abridged understanding of the nation’s 
history.  In fact, though Uganda’s constitution guarantees religious freedom for all of its citizens, 
including the three primary religious groups in the nation (Republic of Uganda 1995), Muslims, 
Anglicans, and Catholics have long vied for primacy over the state.  The problem is that CFS cite 
Rita M. Byrnes’ (1992) study on Uganda, which notes the peaceful transition from British 
colonial rule that resulted in a series of compromises between different factions, while 
overlooking the earlier heritage of religious violence imprinted on Uganda in the late-1800s.  
The emergence of a military alliance between Anglican and Catholic missionaries to the 




Christian alliance itself broke, sparking a series of Anglo-Catholic religious conflicts in 1888 that 
culminated in 1892 in a civil war.  It was the emergence of Idi Amin Dada though that gave form 
to old Muslim grievances against Christians, leading to the deaths of more than 100,000 
Ugandans.  The ouster of Idi Amin led in turn to the installation of a more secular government 
when Yoweri Museveni’s Anglican-based National Resistance Movement came to power, but 
Joseph Kony’s Catholic-based LRA emerged in 1987 as a result of that transition (Byrnes 1992; 
CFS 2009; Curtin 2000; Kiyimba 1990 and 2012; and Twesigye 2010 and 2012). 
By contrast, the situation in Malawi 800 miles to the south is quite different.  Unlike 
Uganda, Malawi has only experienced four terrorist attacks since 1970 (Berkebile 2015; START 
2016).
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  CFS (2009, 194-198) attribute this stability to, inter alia, a combination of tribal and 
ethnic diversity, the early emergence of a common national identity, and economic stability.  
Like Uganda, Malawi’s constitution also guarantees religious freedom, but unlike Uganda, the 
Malawian government has consistently acted in accord with these constitutional principles 
(Republic of Malawi 1994; U.S. Department of State 2000-2009).  Farr (2008) might suggest 
Malawi’s genuine respect for religious freedom represents the key distinction from the instability 
of Uganda.  Thus, instead of contributing to terrorism and other acts of violent extremism, 
religious actors in Malawi instead participate frequently in interreligious dialogue and 
democratic activism. 
For instance, in March 1992, with the private support of Pope John Paul II, a network of 
Roman Catholic bishops in Malawi openly challenged the regime of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda in an effort to direct their nation towards a path of justice and freedom.  For their first 
Lenten address that year, clerics in every church throughout Malawi read aloud from “Living 




regime for its failings and abuses, and sparked a series of events that would lead to the 
emergence of multiparty elections in Malawi.  First, however, the letter was deemed seditious, 
and the bishops—along with many others possessing copies of the document—were arrested.  In 
spite of the government crackdown, several other churches eventually spoke out in support of the 
bishops, in the process establishing an interfaith organization, the Public Affairs Committee 
(PAC), comprised of Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims.  PAC quickly became a leader in the 
fight for democratization by actively applying the pressure for multiparty elections to which the 
Banda regime would eventually acquiesce.  To this day, the interfaith organization remains a 
watchdog for the democratic health of Malawian politics (Meredith 2005; Mitchell 2002; and 
Public Affairs Committee). 
What explains the persistent violence of the LRA, or other terrorist organizations, like Al 
Shabaab in Somalia, while Malawi remains terrorism-free?  Any number of contextual factors 
could be at play.  As Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah (2011; 
hereinafter TPS) observe, the New Atheists (e.g., Harris 2004; Maher 2008) might be inclined to 
argue that religion is always and everywhere wired for violence, but the episode of regime 
change in Malawi illustrates that religious actors can also promote democratic development and 
interfaith dialogue.  In other words, for every instance of religious violence one may cite (like the 
case of the LRA in Uganda), there are counter-examples of religious actors contributing 
positively to human social life.  Groups like PAC in Malawi stand out as prime examples of 
interfaith dialogue, while other groups, such as the Community of Sant’Egidio, for instance, 
promote peaceful conflict resolution throughout the globe.  In drawing attention to this 
ambivalence, Applebee (2000) recognizes that the task for scholars of religion and politics is to 




the conditions under which religion may instead become associated with positive public goods, 
like interfaith dialogue or peaceful conflict resolution.  Thus, the RFPT, with its emphasis on 
political context, fits best under the neo-Weberian rubric, rather than under the primordialist or 
instrumentalist approaches to religious violence. 
Overview of What Follows  
Bearing these concerns in mind, the argument unfolds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on terrorism and the clash of civilizations.  Here, I also flesh out the so-called 
“diversity dividend,” situating the phenomenon in the broader body of research on religious and 
ethnic diversity in IR.  This is important because these two phenomena stand at odds.  In the 
third chapter though, after I define religious freedom, I link the “diversity dividend” and the 
clash of civilizations to the RFPT, while demonstrating that this connection requires a more 
substantive theoretical underpinning than is presently offered in the literature.  Consequently, I 
turn to Locke’s (1667; 1689) contributions on tolerance in early modern Anglo-American 
political philosophy to explicitly integrate religious diversity into the RFPT.  Chapter 4 discusses 
my research design, presents several hypotheses, and discusses my data.  Here, I elaborate how 
exactly I employ data from both the RDWTI (2016) and GTD (Berkebile 2015; START 2016) to 
test the RFPT.  Chapter 5 turns to the empirical analysis, and Chapter 6 concludes with a critical 
reflection on these findings.  Here, I offer a metatheoretical contribution to the literature by 
problematizing the normative consequences and policy implications of the religious freedom 
research agenda.  By relating the RFPTs possible policy consequences to Elizabeth Shakman 
Hurd’s (2013; 2015) recent work on the subject, and critical scholarship on tolerance and the 
democratic peace thesis (DPT), I introduce an element of methodological pluralism like that 




wrap the discussion in Chapter 6 up by turning to the limitations of the study, and implications 





2 | The Clash of Civilizations and the Diversity Dividend 
 
When Huntington (1993a; 1993b; 1996) proposed his “clash of civilizations” thesis, he 
suggested that outbreaks of political violence in the post-Cold War era would cluster around the 
fluid “fault-lines” of religious, ethnic, and linguistic identity existing both within and between 
civilizations.  His macro-level assertions—that civilizational affinities would drive a wedge 
between nation-states from rival cultural groupings, leading to outbursts of conflict—have been 
thoroughly investigated, but remain largely unsubstantiated (Ellingsen 2000, Gartzke and 
Gleditsch 2006, Gurr 1994; and Henderson and Tucker 2001).  Largely overshadowed by this 
debate on the clash of civilizations as a cause of war though, Huntington’s frequent assertions 
about micro-level political violence—that adjacent sub-national groups will be enlisted into the 
fault-line struggles between competing civilizations—remain understudied.  While some 
research examines the links between the clash and ethnic conflict on one hand, with civil war on 
the other (see, respectively, Fox 2002; and Henderson and Singer 2000), Huntington often asserts 
that the clash of civilizations manifests at the micro-level as a particular form of asymmetric 
conflict: terrorism. 
The Clash of Civilizations and Domestic Terrorism 
In his seminal Foreign Affairs article, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Huntington (1993a) 
writes of terrorism as a “weapon of the weak,” used primarily by Muslims to compensate for 
asymmetric power imbalances in their civilizational conflict with the West.  Terrorism is, he 
maintains, a form of quasi-warfare employed by Islamic militants in an effort to “exploit the 




Islamic supported terrorism—the bombings of planes, and seizing of hostages—and the Western 
imposition of sanctions on Libya after the bombing of Pan Am 103 as manifestations of the fault-
line conflict between the West and Islam (Huntington 1993a: 31, 40).  In a follow up article, 
Huntington (1993b) points to the first World Trade Center bombing, suggesting that the 
indictment of the Blind Sheik, Omar Abdel Rahman, and his followers for their roles in the 
attack also fits his “paradigm.”  Yet, terrorism isn’t just a concern with the Muslim World.  
Huntington (1996: 212, 241) suggests that it also complicates relations between the West and 
Africa, so even the 1993 blacklisting of the Sudan as a terrorist state, he suggests, could be taken 
as further evidence of the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993b).   
Though a few studies examine this relationship indirectly (e.g., de Soysa and Nordås 
2007; and Piazza 2009; also see Fox 2005) by looking at the link between terrorism and religion, 
particularly where Islam is concerned, Huntington’s claims are often found wanting.  To my 
knowledge, the only two studies that explicitly consider the relationship between the clash and 
terrorist violence yield similar conclusions (CFS, 2009; and Neumayer and Plümper 2009).
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First, Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper (2009) pit the clash of civilizations against a strategic 
theory of international
11
 terrorism.  While they find evidence of greater cross-civilizational 
attacks emanating towards the West from the Islamic World, they conclude that, by providing 
material support to foreign governments, Western countries render themselves viable targets to 
local terror groups when the latter deem their governments corrupt or illegitimate (Neumayer and 
Plümper 2009: 733).  Thus, what appears at first glance to be a clash of civilizations is better 
explained as strategic targeting. 
Second, CFS compare the effects of four different causal mechanisms on both domestic 




effect of religious and ethnic diversity on the number of terrorist attacks that have occurred over 
the last four decades, they seek to determine if Huntington’s clash could be driving a surge in 
political violence occurring throughout these disparate regions.  Surprisingly, where they initially 
expected to find an increase in ethno-religious diversity to correlate with increased levels of 
terrorism, they instead find a “diversity dividend,” suggesting that states with more diverse 
ethno-religious demographics are less likely to suffer from incidents of terrorist violence.  While 
they concede that their findings contradict Huntington’s expectations, CFS maintain that a clash 
of civilizations remains present under conditions of cultural homogeneity.  They argue that the 
greatest numbers of terrorist attacks occur when a society is dominated by one or two ethnic or 
religious groups, possibly because groups that achieve social supremacy become capable of 
restricting the activities of minorities who respond in turn with violence (CFS 2009). 
 Additionally, the existence of the “diversity dividend” would not contradict Huntington’s 
micro-level assertions if the clash of civilizations were only to manifest at a particular level of 
analysis, such as the transnational.  Consequently, the diversity dividend might be driven by 
features unique to the domestic level of analysis.  In their analysis of international terrorism, CFS 
(2009) adopt a monadic approach, which assumes that the characteristics of a state make it 
susceptible to terrorism inflows.  Theoretically, this may be sensible when they consider regime 
type, but it becomes more challenging to understand why religious diversity would impact 
terrorism inflows.
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   By contrast, the strength of Neumayer’s and Plümper’s (2009) argument 
stems from their use of directed-dyad analysis (see Young and Findley 2011 for an explanation). 
With that said, however, Nuemayer and Plümper are theoretically indifferent to the subject of 
domestic terror.  Though they agree with CFS that, globally, the majority of terrorist attacks are 




clash at the domestic level as meaningless.  In other words, there may nothing special about 
finding a domestic diversity dividend that exists in tandem with the clash on a separate level of 
analysis because clashing civilizations simply do not exist at a domestic level of analysis.  In 
fact, Nuemayer and Plümper argue that Huntington’s thesis “make[s] no predictions about the 
extent of domestic terrorism” (722). 
Yet, Huntington’s thesis saves plenty of room for domestic conflict under the category of 
micro-level civilizational violence, which occurs when adjacent subnational groups along 
civilizational fault-lines vie for control of a given area.  In “The Clash of Civilizations?,” he 
points out that civilizational conflicts can occur between sub-national groups just as they might 
among states, and since civilizational boundaries actually overlap, there is no reason to think that 
conflict between different civilizational groups cannot break out with-in those states, especially 
where religion is concerned!  Not only does religion form the primary basis for identity that 
unites Huntington’s massive civilizations, it commonly transcends national borders.  Just 
consider his discussion of Europe, where the continent’s most significant fault-line is shown 
bisecting many countries—Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro—throughout 
Eastern Europe.  In Huntington’s view, the division between the Protestant-Catholic West, and 
the Orthodox East opens many of these states to outbreaks of domestic violence (Huntington 
1993a, 22-30). 
 As if that were not enough though, Huntington (1996: 207-208, 252) explicitly states that 
micro-level conflicts can occur between geographically proximate “groups from different 
civilizations within a state” (emphasis added).  Furthermore, he points to racially motivated anti-
Islamic policies that target migrants in places like France and Germany as evidence in support of 




peoples of different civilizations can render them “candidates for dismemberment” (Huntington 
1993a: 42).   France and Germany may not be nearing this point, but Huntington does suggest 
that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were prime examples, and he also holds up the U.S. as an 
instance of a country in trouble.  Suggesting that states straddling civilizational fault-lines are at 
risk of an “internal clash,” he points directly to immigration from Latin America, and policies of 
multiculturalism
13
 as a real danger to American identity.  He also highlights the clash between 
Muslims and Hindus in India.  He notes that civil wars frequently break out along religious fault-
lines, particularly in Africa where Christians and Muslims in Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria 
epitomize micro-level civilizational conflict, and finally, he offers the cases of the Balkans, 
Israel, Burma, and the Philippines as additional examples (Huntington 1993a: 32-35, 42; 
Huntington 1993b; also see Friedman 2009: 223-248; and Huntington 2004). 
Nuemayer and Plümper (2009) aren’t necessarily incorrect to suggest that Huntington 
offers no specific hypotheses about domestic terrorism, but with the above in mind, CFS (2009) 
are absolutely right to proceed with an understanding that his fault-lines can materialize within 
states as well as between them.  And since civilizational conflict can produce outbreaks of 
terrorism, a real potential exists for micro-level civilizational differences to provoke incidents of 
domestic terrorism.  Accordingly, CFS’s (2009) monadic approach, flawed though it may be at 
the international level, seems a perfectly appropriate way to consider the effect of the clash on 
domestic terrorism, methodologically and theoretically.  Of course, this makes their discovery of 
the diversity dividend more significant than it might otherwise have seemed if one were to 
assume that the clash of civilizations operates exclusively at a transnational level of analysis.  So, 
if a clash is theoretically possible at the domestic level, does the discovery of a diversity 




Ethnic and Religious Diversity and Political Violence 
Though Cox (2015) urges caution about the generalizability of the diversity dividend, 
evidence of its existence has been observed before, across multiple levels of analysis in different 
areas of research dealing with religion and ethnicity alike, and using different sources of data.  
For instance, Donald Horowitz (1985) suggests that heterogeneity leads to reductions of ethnic 
violence.  James Fearon and David Laitin (1996) assert that interethnic relations are more often 
characterized by peaceful interaction than violence, and they subsequently find neither ethnic nor 
religious diversity to be associated with civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  Meanwhile, Indra de 
Soysa and Neumayer (2008) observe that cultural diversity is associated both with peaceful 
conflict resolution and reductions in defense spending.  Evidence for the diversity dividend has 
also been observed in specific contexts.  Where Matthias Basedau, et al. (2011) argue that 
religiously fractionalized African states are less prone to conflict, Hein Goemans and Kenneth 
Schultz (forthcoming) find the inverse: ethnic homogeneity is a significant predictor of territorial 
aggression in Africa.  In fact, the diversity dividend has been observed so frequently that Robert 
Putnam (2007) points to “contact theory”—the idea that people overcome their ignorance of 
outsiders as they encounter them in everyday life—for one possible explanation 
However, research on state-sponsored militancy (San-Akca 2009; Bapat 2011) reveals 
that ethnically fragmented states are more likely to sponsor violence against their enemies than 
homogenous states, suggesting that the diversity dividend does not extend into the realm of 
covert operations.  This finding has not been linked explicitly to Huntington’s thesis, but it is 
interesting, because he expects competing ethnic groups in rival states to call on their kinsmen 
for aid in times of strife (Huntington 1993a).  Moreover, similar dynamics have been observed at 




conflicts (see Goemans and Schultz, forthcoming).  Additionally, this offers reason to believe 
that the clash and diversity dividend may exist in tandem, increasing the need to elucidate the 
conditions under which each may manifest.  If the diversity dividend has a mitigating effect on 
domestic and international terrorism as CFS suggest, perhaps future research can determine if the 
clash of civilizations exacerbates state-sponsored violence instead.  To date, no direct test of this 
hypothesis has been carried out, but Zeev Maoz’s and Belgin San-Akca’s (2012) research on 
non-state armed groups further suggests that this may be the case since states are unlikely to 
sponsor non-state actors against the countries with which they share cultural affinities. 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that several scholars do see the diversity 
dividend as a direct contradiction of Huntington’s thesis.  By way of illustration, Fearon and 
Laitin (2003: 75) suggest that the diversity dividend “runs contrary to a common view among 
journalists, policy makers, and academics, which holds ‘plural’ societies to be especially conflict 
prone due to ethnic or religious tensions and antagonisms.”  In other words, it challenges the 
conventional wisdom of primordialist theory.  Similarly, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch 
(2006) suggest that the diversity dividend turns the clash of civilizations thesis on its head—a 
strong claim given their argument that cultural differences should be viewed as a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition for warfare.  Still, while their suggestion that scholars should explore 
why cultural differences often “coincide with peace” is a poignant one (Gartzke and Gleditsch 
2006: 77), a conditional model of cultural violence need not stand at odds with Huntington’s 
thesis.  In fact, Huntington (1993a: 25) concedes that “[d]ifferences do not necessarily mean 
conflict, and [that] conflict does not necessarily mean violence”—a claim consistent with the 
expectations of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and other works on religion and 




expectations of the clash of civilizations thesis.  How is the diversity dividend to be accounted 
for then? 
Since scholars—Putnam (2007) excluded—are frequently surprised to find evidence of 
the diversity dividend, they usually only offer post-hoc ideas as possible explanations for their 
findings.  As these explanations remain largely disconnected from one another, odds are good 
that they limn an incomplete theoretical explanation of the diversity dividend.  For instance, 
Fearon and Latin (1996) postulate that in-group policing structures may help prevent the 
outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict, but what about out-group dynamics?  For their part, while they 
maintain that a clash may be present under conditions of homogeneity, CFS (2009) reason that 
the peace dividend manifests under conditions of heterogeneity because it constitutes a de facto 
system of cultural checks and balances.  It goes without saying that religious and ethnic diversity 
should not be confused, and though it is important to remember that these are distinct 
phenomena, CFS see a similar causal logic at work: this system of cultural checks and balances 
would make it too costly for one group—ethnic or religious—to abuse the rights of another in a 
diverse society since multiple minorities could act in concert to prevent such abuses.  
Consequently, they reason that heterogeneity fosters an “atmosphere of compromise” capable of 
inhibiting terrorism, while homogeneity must therefore foster the conditions of exploitation ripe 
for terrorism (CFS 2009: 62, 80).  Still, this reveals little of the potential in-group dynamics at 
play in the decision to turn to or from terrorism.  Finally, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002), 
who claim that ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization all reduce the risk of civil war in 
Africa, suspect that rebel movements simply cannot maintain cohesion under conditions of 





The Diversity Dividend and the RFPT 
Though the diversity dividend seems to contravene Huntington’s thesis, the preceding 
discussion reinforces the need for a neo-Weberian approach that tries to understand the possible 
circumstances under which diversity may contribute to violent or non-violent political activity.  
Cox (2015) himself agrees, and he points to the RFPT as a possible explanation for the religious 
diversity dividend.  He notes, for example, that the conflict between Catholics and Muslims in 
the Philippines is driven by grievances against real and perceived instances of religious 
intolerance.  Interestingly, the diversity dividend thus parallels Farr’s (2008) expectations; in 
fact, it can be directly subsumed by the RFPT.  As Grim and Finke (2006: 6) highlight, state 
deregulation of religion “sharply increase[s] the supply and activity of religion” itself.  
Moreover, the idea that violence is ameliorated under conditions of heterogeneity when groups in 
a given social context become large enough to prevent moves by their competitors to stifle their 
freedoms is entirely consistent with a religious economy approach to terrorism (Iannaccone and 
Berman 2006), and the RFPT’s Madisonian underpinnings.  Contextualizing the diversity 
dividend in this way therefore helps Cox move beyond post-hoc explanations by adding 
theoretical depth and nuance to an otherwise insufficiently understood empirical regularity.  
Unfortunately though, the approach to the RFPT presently ascendant in academic discourse on 
religion and politics remains divorced from a rich tradition of Anglo-American political thought 
on the subject, which cripples its ability to understand the conditional effects of religious 




3 | Religious Toleration in Lockean Political Thought 
 
The RFPT as advanced by Thomas Farr (2008) and others (e.g., Grim 2008; Grim and 
Finke 2007 and 2011; Muchlinski 2014; and TPS 2011) sees religious freedom an essential 
component to international and domestic tranquility.  According to Farr (2008), the expansion of 
religious freedom throughout the world will increase political stability, resulting in a cascade of 
social benefits, including reductions in all forms of political violence.  Religious freedom, that is, 
fosters democracy while increasing social capital, economic modernization, and several aspects 
of human development including literacy among women.  Furthermore, as respect for religious 
freedom encourages governmental self-restraint, it becomes associated with a bundle of human 
rights, thus leading to a reduction in torture, rape, and unjust imprisonment.  Finally, since 
religious persecution can trigger religious extremism, the development of religious freedom is 
believed to reduce religious violence and terrorism in particular (Cox 2015; Farr 2011; Grim 
2008; Grim and Finke 2011; Muchlinski 2014).  In this chapter, I explore the RFPT further by 
first considering what it means for a state to be religiously free, then by looking at the normative 
justifications for the RFPT, and finally, by exploring the implications of Locke’s work on 
toleration for the religious freedom research agenda. 
Religious Freedom Conceptualized 
Since this thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship between religious freedom 
and terrorism, it is important to understand what these two concepts entail.  Terrorism and 
domestic terror were, of course, defined in Chapter 1.  I consider the meaning of religious 




proponent of the RFPT.  Since his approach is normatively grounded in the works of the 
American “Founding Fathers,” particularly James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, I then turn to 
the First Amendment.  Finally, I reflect briefly on the place of religious tolerance and pluralism 
in the conceptualization of religious freedom, but this subject is the primary focus of Chapter 6, 
where it is further developed.
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For Farr (2008), religious liberty does several things.  First, it allows individuals and 
groups to “embrace or reject” the obligations demanded of them upon entrance into a religious 
community, which means people are also free to exit such communities at will.  Next, to 
guarantee their religious liberty, governments must refrain from attempts at coercing individuals 
and groups in theological matters.  Additionally, these people should, in a normative sense, have 
a right to belief or disbelief.  This freedom of conscience, as it might be described, is hinged on 
the presumed inviolability of the human mind.  In other words, the human mind cannot (or at 
least should not) be made to believe things involuntarily.  Consequently, the freedoms of religion 
and conscience together imply that people should have the right to live in accordance with the 
religious truths or principles espoused by their faith communities.  Finally, Farr suggests that 
religious liberty entails a right to engage in public discourse to share one’s faith with others in an 
effort to peacefully elicit their conversion, though he acknowledges the controversial place of 
proselytization in discussions of religious freedom abroad (Farr 2008, 22-25). 
So defined, Farr (2008; 2010; 2011; 2013) believes the promotion of religious freedom 
by the U.S. government abroad can foster democracy, promote economic development, and 
“denude” societies of the contextual conditions that enable extremism.  As such, Farr (2010, 
2011; 2013) has been intensely critical of the Obama Administration’s performance on 




Obama, along with Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, to concentrate on 
domestic policy priorities, like gay marriage—a word Farr (2013) accentuates with scare quotes.  
He views the Administration’s actions, that is, as a deliberative attempt to abridge the freedom of 
religion as an extension of the president’s allegedly arbitrary decision to promote other “rights” 
deemed comparable to or more important than religious freedom.  So, when Secretary Clinton 
(2009) gave a speech on human rights that emphasized a freedom of worship and a right to love 
others in whatever way a person may choose, Farr (2013) was unimpressed.  He laments that the 
“putative ‘right to love’” clearly subordinates religious freedom to “same-sex ‘marriage’” in the 
Administration’s overall policy priorities. 
The possibility that the freedom of conscience and Free Exercise Clause may work 
together to frame gay marriage as a right protected under the rubric of religious freedom (DeLaet 
and Caufield 2008) notwithstanding, Farr’s (2013) more trenchant criticism demonstrates that an 
exclusive focus on worship (at the expense of religious freedom in general) demotes religious 
practice to a private activity by ignoring the “civic implications” of religious belief.  While the 
debate over the proper place of religion in a liberal society persists (e.g., Neal 2014; Sweetman 
2015), this clearly represents the same kind of public-private binary that feminist IR scholars 
(e.g., Sjoberg and Tickner 2012; Tickner 1992; 2009) have long discussed and decried for 
undermining human agency and knowledge claims lacking support in masculine experiences of 
the world.  By eroding the agency of religious actors, policymakers (and scholars for that matter) 
contribute to a normative variant of the secularization thesis that ultimately seeks to eliminate 
religion in the public sphere rather than understand secularization as an empirical phenomenon 




Treating the freedom to worship as religious freedom rather than as a dimension of 
religious freedom thus stands at odds with Farr’s more expansive understanding of religious 
freedom, which is rooted in Madison’s work.  The Framers of the American Bill of Rights, led 
by Madison, included two clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution barring 
Congress from making any laws that infringe on religious liberty.  The first, the “Establishment 
Clause,” forbids the government from crafting laws that respect the “establishment of religion,” 
meaning that the government cannot recognize a “national religion” on one hand, or that specific 
churches and religious movements cannot be excluded from the social fabric of American life by 
an act of the federal legislature on the other.  Meanwhile, the second, or the “Free Exercise 
Clause,” keeps Congress from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, effectively freeing all 
Americans to participate in any religious activity of their choosing.  Framed as such, religious 
freedom seems to include the ability to practice one’s faith collectively or individually without 
government interference.  Such understandings are often proffered by organizations like the 
American Civil Liberties Union (2016), which contends that the First Amendment’s protection 
of free exercise also extends to the right not to worship or the right to disbelief, while the 
Establishment Clause will proscribe preferential treatment to any sect; and yet, this still seems 
incomplete. 
Madison might agree.  The original language of what would eventually become the First 
Amendment contained stronger language when Madison first drafted the Bill of Rights.  “The 
civil rights of none,” Madison (1789) proposed, 
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor 
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and 
equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, 





What’s more, Madison’s proposal to protect religious freedom also extended to the states, while 
the First Amendment applied exclusively to the federal government until the Fourteenth was 
ratified in 1868.  At any rate, the idea, as Farr and others (e.g., Gill 2008) might agree, was that 
people have a full suite of rights associated with the freedoms of conscience and religion, which 
may even be why this right comes packaged in the Constitution with other civil liberties, 
including the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble.  Thus, while someone 
like Jefferson (1802) can write of a “wall of separation between Church [and] State” when 
describing the First Amendment, the fact that religious freedom entails an ability to act on one’s 
beliefs precludes him or any other from discussing an impenetrable wall between faith and 
politics, the absence of which is precisely what gives rise to faith-inspired political action, like 
that epitomized by the Moral Majority. 
 Properly understood, this means that religious freedom is not synonymous with 
secularism, though the two are almost certainly related. As Hurd (2008) observes, secularism 
typically comes in two varieties.  The first, laicism, treats religion as an adversary to modern 
politics and tries to force it from the public sphere.  The second, Judeo-Christian secularism, sees 
religion as the basis of group identity and social unity.  Each logically leads to a distinct take on 
religious freedom.  Where the former would drive religious practice into the private sphere, the 
latter would consciously encourage its public expression.  The U.S. may fall more in line with 
the Juedo-Christian expression of secularism, but the notion of religious freedom articulated by 
Madison and Jefferson actually hints at a third way: pluralism. 
 As James A. Beckford (2014) observes, pluralism is often mistaken for diversity, an 
empirically observable social condition defined by the presence of different people.  Religious 




country.  By contrast, religious pluralism, like religious exclusivism and inclusivism, is actually 
a normative response to diversity that may adhere to different worldviews, philosophies, and 
theological systems.  Pluralism can go as far as assuming that different religions are essentially 
equal in their truth content, meaning that they should be treated alike without assuming one is 
inherently better than another (Dueck 2013).  A more conservative approach to pluralism simply 
underscores “the positive value of religious diversity in itself,” by promoting religious diversity 
as “a means to the attainment of social and cultural cohesion and harmony” (Beckford 2014, 22).  
By contrast, religious exclusivism, which assumes the supremacy of one religion over all others, 
views diversity as threatening, while inclusivism, which recognizes the supremacy of one 
religion, tries to tolerate heterogeneity (Dueck 2013). 
 Evidence of Madison’s pluralist worldview stems from several sources, including his 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), as well as Federalist 10 
(1787) and Federalist 51 (1788).  Although he played an important role in the articulation of 
Article XVI of The Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776, the protection of religious freedom 
therein privileges Christianity.  By the mid- to late-1880s however, when he would author the 
Memorial and Remonstrance and contribute to the Federalists, Madison had come to recognize 
the value of diversity in Virginia.  He had seen a multiplicity of religious sects give rise to 
political stability by preventing one “faction” from overcoming another (Arkin 1995).  
Accordingly, Madison (1785) argued that religious taxes would undermine religious moderation 
and social harmony by privileging the Episcopal Church at the expense of all others.  He built on 
this argument further in his treatise on faction, suggesting that freedom is the key to mitigating 
the conflict produced by diverse special interests, political parties, and religious sects.  The 




invade the rights of another.  Indeed, he argued that the emergence of one dangerous religious 
sect could be kept in check by “the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of [the nation]” 
(Madison 1787), laying the ground work for what CFS (2009) might recognize in Federalist 51 
as a de facto system of cultural checks and balances. 
 Of course, Federalist 51 is primarily concerned with the legal system of checks and 
balances that keeps the three branches of the federal government in balance by protecting each 
from the other.  Yet, Madison’s pluralist worldview still creeps in: 
Whilst all authority in [the United States] will be derived from and 
dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so 
many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of 
individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from 
interested combinations of the majority (Madison 1788). 
 
At first blush, the implications of this argument for religious freedom may not be apparent, but 
when combined with his arguments from Federalist 10 and the Memorial and Remonstrance, it 
is evident that Madison has recognized the value of human diversity and the role it plays in 
building a stable society.  The link is made more explicit when he adds that “security for civil 
rights must be the same as that for religious rights” because the former recognizes a multiplicity 
of interests while the latter defers to a multiplicity of sects.  This system of cultural checks and 
balances, that is, can prevent a majority from harming the will of a minority most of the time, in 
Madison’s formulation, because any coalition of “interests, parties, and sects” large enough to do 
so could only rarely emerge (Madison 1788). 
 One of the novel features of Madison’s pluralism is that it reached beyond the kinds of 
religious tolerance practiced by religious inclusivists attempting to cope with religious diversity 
in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation.  Religious tolerance is discussed at length later, 




diversity.  Tolerance, as the political tolerance literature makes clear, can be “[d]efined as the 
willingness to put up with groups or ideas one finds objectionable” while resisting the urge to 
repress the proponents of said ideas (Peffley, et al., 2016; emphasis added).  When the colonial 
assembly of Maryland passed An Act Concerning Religion in 1649, Maryland became one of the 
world’s first political entities to extend religious tolerance to nonconformists by guaranteeing the 
“free exercise” of religion in “matters of conscience.”  However, the regime articulated under the 
act was one built on an inclusivist notion of tolerance, limiting religious freedom to Christian 
sects (including Catholics), but enforcing tolerance among the public at-large by proscribing 
insults aimed at members of rival sects while enumerating harsh penalties for blasphemy.  
Instead, in Madison’s vision of American society, “[t]he right of every man is to liberty—not 
tolerance” (quoted in Arkin 1995), meaning religious groups could actively participate in social 
life entirely free from government interference. 
With this in mind, religious freedom is—for Madison, like Farr—a broad notion meant 
not only to protect the private freedom of conscience and its private expression in worship, but 
also the religious actor’s ability to publically act on all concordant beliefs.  In this sense, one 
might suggest that religious freedom exists on a spectrum (TPS 2011), and that the protection of 
religious liberty on the spectrum involves a litany of policies touching on a diverse range of 
issues from education, to land-use, and expression (Gill 2008).  As Anthony Gill (2008) 
maintains, it’s not an either/or proposition as the legal articulation of a religious freedom policy 
in a country’s constitution may otherwise suggest.  It therefore entails an ongoing project to 
negotiate and renegotiate the legitimate bounds of religious agency in public life across issue-




provisions affirming free exercise while failing to respect religious liberty in practice (see 
Chapter 6). 
Indeed, constitutions from around the globe often contain some kind of religious freedom 
clause, but attempts to legislate on matters of religion are ubiquitous, even among states formally 
establishing a separation between religion and state (Fox 2011).  Additionally, where religious 
freedom clauses are indicative of the government’s commitment to religious liberty, they are 
similarly poor measures of religious tolerance among members of the society at-large, ultimately 
rendering it necessary to distinguish between religious freedom in formal law (de jure religious 
liberty), religious freedom in practice (de facto religious liberty), and social tolerance of religious 
diversity.  Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke (2006) address the notion of socially regulated 
religion, but the issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Jonathan Fox’s (2011) work on 
constitution clauses deals with de jure religious liberty, but this phenomenon is likewise beyond 
the scope of the present analysis.  My discussions of religious freedom ahead thus concentrate on 
the actual behavior of states rather than the place of religious liberty in formal law.  Suffice it to 
say, religious liberty in either sense though, refers to a package of interrelated freedoms 
guaranteeing individuals and groups the ability to freely exercise their religions in accordance 
with their beliefs.  Operationalizing religious freedom according to this definition presents some 
minor issues, but I will return to this subject ahead of the empirical analysis in the next chapter. 
The Normative Justification for the RFPT 
 With the foregoing in mind, Farr often cites the place of religious liberty in the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as the normative justification behind the RFPT.  Though 
religious freedom entails a cluster of rights, he typically describes the freedoms of religion and 




religion was “crucial for the health of democracy” (Farr 2013: 39).  Accordingly, he sees the 
freedom of conscience as the right to pursue religious truths free from coercion, while religious 
freedom grants people the rights to live in accordance with those truths (2008: 22-23).  Morally, 
Farr (2010) insists that the U.S. has a duty to promote religious freedom abroad because, 
ingrained into its identity since the time of its founding is a belief that violations of conscience 
constitute an injustice against human dignity.  Practically, however, he contends that the failure 
to grant these freedoms inspires disaffected minorities to violence.  Hence the reason he 
advocates greater emphasis for these freedoms in the U.S.’s counterterrorism policy and national 
security strategy.  Consequently, there is no doubt that Farr was pleased with the ascension of 
these so-called “first freedoms” to the status of foreign policy priority when Congress passed the 
International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) in 1998.  Unfortunately though, he has grown 
largely frustrated with the State Department’s lethargic implementation of the law, so he 
continues to invoke the likes of Madison and Jefferson in his efforts to further raise the profile of 
religious freedom in American foreign policy circles (Farr 2008; 2010; 2011; 2013). 
 Meanwhile, Grim and Finke (2011) similarly point to the example of the U.S. and its 
founding fathers.  They suggest that Madison and Jefferson internalized lessons taught 
previously by the likes of Voltaire, David Hume, and Adam Smith, when they first started 
promoting religious freedom to their peers in the colonies and states as a tool to ameliorate social 
and religious conflict.  Of course, Madison did borrow from Smith who in turn borrowed from 
Hume, but the founder also drew on Locke.  As noted in Federalists 10 and 51, religious 
freedom is about fostering the stability of the state, a sentiment consistent with Locke’s views.  
Of course, Madison also recognized that religious freedom was key to the proliferation of sects 




was as important to regime stability as religious freedom, since the former discouraged 
fanaticism and encouraged moderation in the processes of winning converts in the context of a 
religious market or religious economy (Arkin 1995; Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Madison 
1787 and 1788; Smith 1776; and Zagorin 2003). 
TPS (2011: 44) also agree that the church-state relationship plays an important role in 
shaping the behaviors of religious actors.  They argue that where states have conflictual 
relationships with religious groups, the latter will be prone to committing acts of terrorism, while 
religious actors living in regimes with U.S.-style religious freedom—a church-state relationship 
characterized by consensual independence—will be likely to promote peaceful conflict 
mediation.  With the exception of Grim’s and Finke’s brief overview of Enlightenment era works 
on religious freedom by Voltaire, Hume, and Smith, the problem with these approaches is that 
they present religious freedom as if it were a uniquely American phenomenon, subject to export 
for security purposes.
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  Neither Farr (2008), nor Grim and Finke (2011), nor TPS (2011) make 
any reference to the classical works on religious toleration by such thinkers as William Penn 
(1670) and John Locke (1667; 1689), each of whom was writing well before Voltaire, Hume, and 
Smith.  Even Anthony Gill’s (2008) seminal contribution on The Political Origins of Religious 
Liberty only briefly references Locke, his status as one of the most important thinkers on 
religious toleration in the 17
th
 century, his contribution to the doctrine of separation of church 
and state, and his influence on later thinkers like Madison and Jefferson notwithstanding (Cox 
1982; Snyder 1988; Zagorin 2003). 
 Though this research has clearly evolved in unique ways, overlooking the contributions 
of thinkers like Locke and Penn, divorces it from a rich Anglo-American philosophical and 




understanding of Enlightenment political philosophy—Locke’s work in particular, but also with 
reference to thinkers like Smith and Madison—can add layers of nuance to debates over the 
relationships between religion, violence, and instability.  This matters for two reasons.  First, as 
scholars like Farr promote religious freedom as a one-size-fits-all solution for the world’s 
political problems abroad, they often overlook the specific social and historical circumstances 
that fostered the Anglo-American tradition of religious freedom in the first place, giving rise to 
issues of empirical generalizability.  Ever the empiricist, Locke stands poised to rectify this issue 
though, as he was intimately acquainted with the realities of his day (Cox 1982). 
Second, while the existence of the diversity dividend can be accounted for by modern 
research on religious freedom and cultural fractionalization, and while its existence seems to be 
irreconcilable with the expectations of the clash of civilizations thesis, incorporating Locke’s 
ideas into current theories of religious freedom can help them account for both!  Recall Gartzke 
and Gleditsch’s (2006) assertion that cultural distinctions provide a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for conflict.  If the effects of religion or religious identity are conditioned by a 
regime’s church-state relationship (TPS 2011), the diversity dividend may not contravene 
Huntington’s thesis at all.  Put another way, religious actors may behave differently in states that 
guarantee their religious freedom than they might in states that constrict their liberties, meaning 
that the diversity dividend and the clash of civilizations might both exist, perhaps even at the 
same time, just under distinct conditions.  By emphasizing Locke’s work, scholars can better 
elucidate his contributions to the theory of religious freedom, ultimately leading to a better 
appreciation of the conditionality of this relationship. 




With the publication of A Letter Concerning Toleration in 1689, Locke joined a chorus of 
Western political philosophers responsible for articulating the normative principles of religious 
freedom that would ultimately undergird the modern separation of church and state.  His ideas, 
however, were clearly shaped by the times.  Born in 1632, Locke matured in the aftermath of the 
Reformation, which would break the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church, sowing the seeds 
of schism, heresy, and religious innovation throughout Northern Europe and England.  Having 
experienced the English Civil War throughout his teenage years, he would turn 16 as the 
tumultuous religious conflicts of continental Europe would reach their climax at Westphalia.  As 
an adult, he would live through Oliver Cromwell’s commonwealth and the Glorious Revolution 
(Cox1982).  He would have seen the wars of religion that followed the Reformation fail to 
restore any semblance of theological unity, and he would have watched the resulting flowering 
of religious diversity with keen eyes, as dissident religious groups would proliferate throughout 
Europe.  Locke also observed the radicalization of religious nonconformists in the face of 
political persecution, as Calvinists, Presbyterians, Quakers, and even Catholics, inter alia, would 
grow dissatisfied with the regime’s harsh treatment of religious minorities, contributing to the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1642 (Gill 2008). 
Resultantly, Locke initially came to see religious toleration as an excuse to promote 
perpetual disorder, which is why he suggests, in his Two Tracts on Government (1660; 1661), 
that people agreeing to live under the rule of a magistrate waive their religious freedoms for the 
sake of security (Zagorin 2003).  His position gradually changed over the next few years 
however.  In his Essay Concerning Toleration (1667), he articulates an embryonic version of the 
church-state doctrine when he asserts that the magistrate should have nothing to do with his 






 Locke argues further that policies of religious conformity actually 
exacerbate religious tensions: 
Nor does this injunction at all conduce to the peace or security of 
the government but quite the contrary, because hereby the 
magistrate does not make any one to be one jot the more of his 
minde [sic], but to be very much more his enemy” (Locke 1667: 
278). 
 
The point was that disciplining nonconformity would likely result in the very violence it sought 
to curtail (Snyder 1988), a contention supported by modern research connecting religious 
discrimination to violent dissent (Akbaba and Taydas 2011; Fox 2004; Gurr 1993, 2000), and 
claims that grievances undergird modern terrorism (Crenshaw 1981).  Illustrating a full about-
face from his original position outlined in the Two Tracts (Locke 1660, 1661) then, Locke avers 
that toleration is the key to countering faction under conditions of religious heterogeneity when 
he suggests that the persecution of religious nonconformists will unite dissidents against the 
government.  Thus, while the magistrate does in fact retain some power over religion as it relates 
to security, Locke ultimately limits the government’s role to the maintenance of men’s comfort, 
not their immortal souls (Locke 1667). 
Developing both a theological and practical political approach to justifying toleration, 
Locke’s arguments become more nuanced in his Letter (1689).  Instrumentalist scholars like Gill 
(2008) overlook these nuances though, as they generally downplay the ideational factors that 
played a role in the emergence of religious freedom in Early Modern England.  On one hand, 
Gill persuasively asserts that decision makers tend to grant religious liberty for strategic reasons, 
as when Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1688.  But Locke would agree, as evidenced 
both by the Letter and his Essay (1667)!  Toleration, in his mind, promotes regime stability.  Yet, 




religious nonconformity.  Of course, this matters for two reasons.  First, the debate taking place 
between him and his contemporaries—including people like Penn—likely helped frame 
Parliament’s policy options in the first place. 
Second, the theological argument in Locke’s Letter sheds light on the normative 
foundation of religious liberty today, because it was used to foster public support for tolerationist 
sentiments, while also mandating international reciprocity.  Although it hinges on Protestant-
centric notions of “true” religion, the epistemological lucidity of Locke’s theological argument is 
quite compelling.  After adopting a kind of methodological agnosticism (Snyder 1988; also see 
Bell and Taylor 2014), he reasons that mankind cannot possess knowledge of “true” religion, 
meaning the magistrate cannot possess knowledge of “true” religion.  Consequently, the 
government can only impose its will in religious matters by jeopardizing the souls of its subjects, 
for the imposition of the magistrate’s will can only, therefore, represent the imposition of his or 
her opinion.  Thus, using state resources to impose conformity in religious matters would hinder 
the growth of “true” religion, because, as Locke trenchantly observes, few if any of the foreign 
rulers throughout Early Modern Europe held the same religious beliefs in the post-Westphalian 
era.  In other words, trying to compel orthodoxy could have the unintended consequence of 
persecuting the “true” religion in most countries (Snyder 1988). 
Though the foreign princes of the European mainland, particularly in Germany, assumed 
the right to establish and enforce a state religion within their respective territories when the 
Peace of Westphalia (1648) produced the principle of cuius regio, euis religio (Philpott 2000; 
Nexon 2009; Lynch 2014), Locke’s call for toleration challenged such notions of sovereignty in 
religious matters by “demonstrating that the consequences of intoleration are undesirable for the 




sought to legitimize diversity in religion at the international level, Locke understood that the 
Reformation created the conditions for diversity at multiple levels throughout society.  Although 
every prince believed his was the “true” religion, their diversity of beliefs guaranteed that at least 
some were persecuting believers of the “true” religion since compulsion occurred in many 
countries throughout the world (Locke 1689: 28).  The risk to “true” religion was thus too 
dangerous for Locke to take contemporary norms of sovereignty seriously: 
In the variety and contradiction of Opinions in Religion, wherein 
the Princes of the World are as much divided as in their Secular 
Interests, the narrow way would be much strained.  One Country 
alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the World would be 
put under an Obligation of following their Princes in the ways that 
lead to Destruction (Locke 1689: 15). 
 
Given that no mortal could ever hope to identify the “true” religion, protecting the “true” religion 
therefore necessitated toleration of religious diversity and mutual reciprocity.  That is, protecting 
Anglicans in Germany, for example, mandates that Lutherans be protected in England (Locke 
1689: 59).  The only religions Locke refuses to grant toleration to, namely, Roman Catholicism, 
are those that themselves refuse to extend tolerance on a reciprocal basis (Locke 1689: 51).  
Though Catholic governments had been known to promote religious toleration elsewhere in the 
world in the early modern period,
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 it is here that Locke’s anti-Catholic bias seems to overpower 
any real concerns he has about persecuting the “true” religion, but such issues can be discussed 





4 | Research Design 
 
By synthesizing the Lockean tradition of toleration with modern research on religious 
freedom and political violence, a clearer causal picture comes into view.  Since Huntington 
expects competing identities to contribute to conflict, CFS are right to predict that more diversity 
could lead to greater incidents of terrorist violence.  Their discovery of a diversity dividend, 
however, is more in line with modern research on religious freedom, which theorizes that 
religious liberty guarantees should be correlated with reduced incidents of political violence.  
The Lockean tradition of toleration, however, has the potential to account for Huntington’s 
expectations, and CFS’s actual findings, as Locke points to the role of religious freedom as an 
intervening variable in a chain of causality that links diversity to political violence.  This means 
that while diversity might be a necessary condition for conflict, it is incapable of sparking 
violence on its own.  Locke, and others (e.g. TPS 2011), might thus posit the church-state 
relationship as the factor needed to ignite a putative “clash of civilizations.”  As summarized in 




Figure 2, the intolerance and discrimination associated with religious regulation are thus needed 
to bring about conflict under conditions of heterogeneity, while cultural heterogeneity under 




Several hypotheses can be derived from this approach.  First, it is important to note that 
because Locke was writing under the conditions of a pre-existing diversity resulting from the 
Reformation, he is agnostic to the effect of religious freedom on violence under conditions of 
homogeneity.  Therefore, the model also remains agnostic to the effect of homogeneity on 
terrorism.  Insofar as the diversity dividend is concerned though, heterogeneity should reduce the 
occurrence of political violence, independent of the effect of religious freedom.  This would be 
consistent with CFS’s findings, and it would also be expected by the religious economy approach 
favored by scholars like Gill (2008) and others (see Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Madison 
1787, 1788; and Smith 1776: 846-875).
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  Since the clash of civilizations thesis might lead some 
scholars (see CFS 2009) to believe the opposite however, I also hypothesize the inverse: 
H1A:  Increased levels of diversity will result in reductions in the occurrence and level of terrorist 
violence. 
 
H1B:  Increased levels of diversity will result in increases in the occurrence and level of terrorist 
violence. 
 
 Given that modern religious freedom theorists (e.g. Farr 2008) all predict that religious 
freedom will lead to reductions in political violence, and increases in regime stability 
independent of diversity, I also hypothesize the following:  
H2:  The presence of religious freedom will result in reductions in the occurrence and level of 
terrorist violence. 
 
However, Locke sees religious freedom as the key to reducing violence under conditions of 




condition the behavior of religious actors.  Thus, to account for the possibility that the clash of 
civilizations may exist alongside the diversity dividend, I also need to consider the role of 
religious freedom as an intervening variable.  As such, I expect diversity to promote violence 
under conditions of religious non-freedom, while I expect diversity to promote reductions in 
violence for states with religious freedom: 
H3A:  Diversity under conditions of religious freedom will result in reductions in the occurrence 
and level of terrorist violence. 
 
H3B:  Diversity under conditions of religious non-freedom will result in increases in the 
occurrence and level of terrorist violence. 
 
Case Selection 
 To test these hypotheses, I collect data from 93 countries in Asia and Africa with 
populations of 1 million or more over a ten year period from 2000-2009.  Since the country-year 
is my unit of analysis, this yields 928 observations.
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  With that said, I am sensitive to the 
neocolonial implications of analyzing the RFPT in an exclusively non-Western context.  Of 
course, this is a subject to which I return in Chapter 6, but it is important to recognize that the 
RFPT, including its neo-Lockean variant,
21
 is an approach articulated primarily by Westerners, 
as is the clash of civilizations thesis.  Locke, an early modern Englishman, Huntington, an 
American, and most of the religious freedom researchers referenced above are white, Western 
men.  Additionally, as noted below, the data on religious freedom is drawn from a Western 
source—the U.S. State Department.  Finally, the very concept of religious freedom is itself 
largely regarded as a Western construct, something Huntington (1993a) even acknowledges.  As 
he asserts, this is important because 
Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in 
other civilizations.  Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, 
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, 




have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, 
Buddhist, or Orthodox cultures.  Western efforts to propagate such 
ideas produce instead a reaction against ‘human rights 
imperialism’ and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be 
seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger 
generation in non-Western cultures (Huntington 1993a). 
 
Nevertheless, I intentionally conduct my analysis using data drawn from the non-Western world 
for a few reasons. 
 First, Farr (2011, 2013) and others often dismiss criticisms of cultural imperialism out of 
hand, but it’s worth noting that before IRFA was passed, many critics accused the faith-based 
coalition of right-leaning groups behind the legislation of using it specifically to “[clear] the way 
for missionaries” in countries previously unwilling to open their boarders to Western proselytists 
(Farr 2008: 115).  Since such missionaries are specifically interested in the 10/40 window, a 





 north latitude where Christians make up an often oppressed minority (Hoover 
2009), it’s worth asking if the RFPT—a Western construct—actually applies in a non-Western 
context.  Testing the RFPT in the context of Asia and Africa could therefore provide strong 
support for the religious freedom research agenda; if not, perhaps there is something to the claim 
that missionaries represent the harbingers of cultural imperialism (Herrington 2012; 2013), but 
more on this later. 
 Second, this study builds on earlier work by CFS (2009) that focuses exclusively on Asia 
and Africa.  Since it represents an attempt to empirically evaluate Cox’s (2015) suggestion that 
the RFPT may explain the diversity dividend, I concentrate on the same regions as he and his 
colleagues.  This study offers several advances over their work though, the first of which is to 
include the states of the Middle East.  At the time of their writing, CFS (2009: 4) believed the 




dangerously understudied.  However, their analysis includes the culturally similar North African 
states, which seems a little puzzling.  The addition of the Middle East here, allows for a more 
thorough comparison of terrorism between regions by avoiding the truncation of the Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) states.  Like CFS (2009) though, I exclude the 11 states of 
Asia and Africa with a population that does not exceed 1 million (see the Appendix for a list). 
 Since one of my goals is to determine if religious freedom can help inoculate a state 
against domestic terrorism, my use of the country-year as the unit of observation also follows 
CFS’s example.  This particular approach is useful for examining the factors that make a state 
vulnerable to experiencing a terrorist attack.  My temporal focus on the period from 2000-2009 
represents a departure from their earlier work though.  In their analysis of domestic terrorism, 
CFS (2009) relied on data from the MIPT-TKB, which means they only had six years of 
available information drawn from the period 1998-2003.  My analysis starts in 2000 because that 
is the earliest year for which religious freedom data is available from the State Department 
(2000-2009), and ends in 2009 because that is the latest year for which terrorism data is available 
from the RDWTI (2016). 
Data 
 I use data from both the RDWTI (2016) and the GTD (Berkebile 2015; START 2016) to 
test the relationship between domestic terrorism and the RFPT.  Though the START (2016) 
dataset technically offers a more comprehensive range of available information than the RDWTI, 
I accept the limitations of the latter for the GTD primarily for the sake of comparison.  This is 
important since the RDWTI’s estimates are more conservative.  Of course, since I follow CFS 
(2009), the RDWTI is also a useful tool because it is the official successor to the MIPT-TKB.
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attacks based on the identities of the attackers and perpetrators as required by the definition 
articulated in Chapter 1 (Berkebile 2015).  This represents a distinct advantage in the GTD, but 
because the GTD is known to contain “some inaccurate, incomplete, and inconsistent coding that 
cannot be easily ignored,” I turn to Richard E. Berkebile’s (2015: 4) modified version of the 
GTD, which was explicitly built as domestic terrorism database.  Furthermore, his dataset makes 
it easy to distinguish between state and non-state victims of domestic terror attacks, and as such, 
the former are altogether eliminated from the universe, making the GTD data more compatible 
with the definition articulated in Chapter 1.  Berkebile’s modified version of the GTD also makes 
information on the religious ideology of the attackers available making it theoretically possible 
to distinguish between religious and non-religious terror attacks.  For reasons outlined in Chapter 
1, differentiating the two would be ideal for this study.  However, practical concerns resulting 
from the shift in the unit of analysis have required that this be delayed for the foreseeable future.  
Instead, the analysis is conducted against the whole universe of remaining cases, with one silver 
lining remaining: since the RDWTI does not include the ability to easily distinguish cases by 
religious ideology, I can take an identical approach to the analysis of both datasets.  
In any event, I subject the hypotheses articulated above to a battery of statistical analyses 
using both datasets.  This should not be mistaken for an attempt to mine the data in search for 
statistical significance though.  Rather, I employ three dependent variables (DVs) and as such, 
my analysis proceeds in three phases.  Since I examine four models using both datasets 
throughout each phase, this produces a total of 24 statistical models, making mine a relatively 
exhaustive analysis of the RFPT. 
Descriptive statistics for the DVs and the remaining variables are summarized in Figure 3 





of my analysis evaluates the impact of diversity and religious freedom on the occurrence rather 
than the rate of terrorism.  Accordingly, I use a dichotomous variable, Attacks (Dichotomized), 
set equal to 1 to indicate whether or not a terrorist attack occurred in a given state.  Given the 
binary nature of this DV, the analysis begins with a series of logit models in lieu of the basic 
OLS approach employed by CFS (2009).
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  Second, I use a count of the total number of terrorist 
attacks, Attacks (Total), experienced by a state in a given year to determine if either religious 
freedom or diversity helps to ameliorate the rate of terrorism.  Finally, since terrorist violence is 
also frequently measured in the literature by the number of casualties resulting from a terror 
attack (e.g., Piazza 2009; Klein 2015), and since groups are expected to moderate in the presence 
of diversity, the third DV, Casualties, measures the total number of people killed or injured in 
domestic attacks each year.  To help account for extreme values in the data, both Attacks (Total) 
and Casualties are analyzed using a negative binomial model. 
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There are two main independent variables that are analyzed in each of these models.  A 
state’s religious diversity, Religious Diversity, is measured using a count variable based on 
information collected from the CIA’s (2000-2009) World Factbook.  CFS (2009) count only 
those religions that comprise at least 10% of a state’s population, but I count all religions 
because the CIA does not report demographic statistics on many states in Asia.  Coding details 
are outlined in the Appendix.  Next, a separate variable is needed to operationalize the presence 
of religious freedom in a state.  For that reason, I draw on the U.S. Department of State’s (2000-
2009) Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, which has been shown to be among 
the most comprehensive and reliable sources of such data (Grim and Finke 2006), to code a 
dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if the state is said to be religiously free (and 0 if it is not).  
The either/or approach entailed by my use of a dichotomous variable could represent a 
shortcoming, as elaborated in Chapter 3, but this coding is based primarily on the either/or 
approach adopted by the State Department in the issuance of its religious freedom reports 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Missing
Religious Diversity 928 4.245 2.123 1 19 0
Ethnicity 928 5.501 6.799 0 47 0
Democracy 897 0.433 6.139 -10 10 31
GDPpcPPP (log) 928 7.892 1.077 5.298 10.958 0
Population (log) 928 16.403 1.485 8.902 21.0149 0
Land Area (log) 928 12.408 1.774 6.458 16.658 0
Attacks (RDWTI) 918 27.389 186.762 0 3968 10
Casualties (RDWTI) 918 161.854 1330.043 0 24796 10
Attacks (GTD) 928 14.214 63.342 0 909 0




(deviations are detailed in the Appendix), and it is useful in determining whether or not a state 
actually respects religious freedom in a de facto sense.  Finally, I include an interaction term to 
help address the third hypothesis. 
Next, CFS (2009) relied exclusively on a series of univariate models, which thus lacked a 
number of possible controls even though several are needed.  First, it is necessary to control for 
democracy.  What little relationship CFS (2009) actually observe between democracy and 
domestic terrorism seems to indicate that democracies will increase the terrorism rate.  This 
would suggest that autocracies are less likely to experience terrorist attacks (Hamilton and 
Hamilton 1983).  Yet, in his study of repression and domestic terrorism, James A. Piazza (2015a) 
shows that government repression designed to increase the cost of terrorism fails as an effective 
counterterrorism policy, while repression designed to quell legitimate dissent actually increases 
domestic terrorism.  This makes it difficult to anticipate the effect of the control, but it is 
necessary as regime type has been commonly put forward as a possible predictor for both 
transnational (Blomberg and Hess 2005; Gelpi and Avdan 2015; Piazza 2008; Weinberg and 
Eubank 1998) and domestic terrorism (Ash 2016).  I therefore account for the presence of 
democracy by including a state’s Polity IV POLITY2 democracy score (Marshall and Gurr 2014). 
With that said, Ghatak (2014) finds that a failure to consolidate democratic institutions 
can contribute to terrorism, which is similar to findings from the transnational literature on 
anocracy and regime instability (CFS 2009).  As noted in Chapter 1, work on religious freedom 
and hate crimes has also emphasized the importance of anocracy (Muchlinski 2014).  As such, I 
include a square term that can help account for a curvilinear relationship by identifying the effect 
of anocracy—transitioning regimes located at the midrange of the Polity scale.  Konstantin Ash 




groups to turn to terrorism.  However, he suggests that such states are also better equipped to 
counter the threat these groups represent, so Ash finds that the terror campaigns experienced by 
anocracies and autocracies are both more intense and longer.  While I cannot meaningfully 
account for temporal variation in the present research design, this may indicate that terror 
campaigns in autocratic and anocratic states will be more violent, producing more casualties than 
in their democratic counterparts. 
With this in mind, it might thus make sense to include James Raymond Vreeland’s 
(2008) X-POLITY measure of democracy.  Polity IV’s democracy scores are based on an index 
that includes an “explicit reference to civil war in [its] coding rules” (Vreeland 2008: 402), 
which has obviously been problematic for studies of civil war that rely on anocracy as an 
important predictor.  Hence, Vreeland’s X-POLITY is calculated without reference to civil war.  
While this may represent a path for future research, the original variable’s reference is to civil 
war, not terrorism.  Furthermore, anocracies are often associated with instability, and though 
Vreeland (2008) explicitly links this to the inclusion of civil war in the index, this instability-
laden anocracy measure is welcome in the present study.  Since CFS’s (2009) replication data is 
no longer available, their measure of instability is also unavailable.  Yet they specifically link 
regime instability and interruptions to the political violence associated with a regime’s transition 
from autocracy to democracy.  In their own words, 
the transition period to democratic governance is asserted by 
several prominent scholars to be one of the most unstable and 
tenuous periods a state can experience (CFS 2009: 34). 
 
Said simply, CFS conceptualize instability in a way that links it intimately to anocracy, and as 





Second, since the condition of a state’s economy has previously been considered 
important (Ghatak and Gold 2015; Haleem 2005), I follow CFS (2009) by controlling for a 
state’s wealth through the inclusion of its per capita Gross Domestic Product (set to Purchasing 
Power Parity) as recorded by the CIA (2000-2009).  Unfortunately, I do not include a measure of 
income inequality, which CFS (2009) specifically use to assess Irm Haleem’s notion of a 
“poverty-terrorism nexus.”  Data on income inequality is hard to come by though, as reliable 
time-series information on a state’s GINI coefficient, the most commonly used measure of 
income inequality, is sparsely available for most of the states in Asia and Africa.  This introduces 
a mild risk of omitted variable bias into the analysis, but I believe it is an acceptable risk given 
that research on poverty and terrorism generally dismisses the rooted-in-poverty thesis or yields 
inconclusive results (Abadie 2006; CFS 2009; Krueger 2007; Piazza 2006).  
Third, I code for the number of politically relevant ethnic groups using Andreas Wimmer, 
et al.’s (2009) “Ethnic Power Relations” (EPR) dataset.  CFS attempt to proxy for political 
relevance by using the CIA’s World Factbook to estimate the total number of ethnic groups that 
exceed 10% of a state’s total population, but as they acknowledge, this 10% cut-off serves as an 
arbitrary measure of relevance.  This is an important consideration though, because CFS find 
evidence of the diversity dividend in their analysis of ethnicity.  Now, while a similar causal 
logic may drive the diversity dividend in regards to both ethnic and religious diversity (see 
Chapter 2), one cannot assume a priori that they will have a similar impact since they are 
conceptually distinct phenomena, distinguished primarily by the fact that a person can change 
their religion in a diverse ideational marketplace.  The same cannot be said for ethnicity.  It is 
also important to include both as separate measures because they each represent an important 




primarily by religion, ethnicity, and language (also see CFS 2009; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006).  
Language, by contrast, can be justifiably dropped from the analysis due to its strong link with 
ethnicity, and because of the sparsity of language data in the World Factbook (CIA 2000-2009). 
Finally, although I only examine countries with populations of 1,000,000 or more, I 
include the natural log of each country’s population and land area using data from the World 
Factbook (CIA 2000-2009).  A series of dummies control for region, and finally, I control for 
duration dependence in the models to compensate for possible violations of temporal 
assumptions, particularly in the logit model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).  At present, I have 
no theoretical reason to expect time to have a substantively intriguing effect on these models, so 





5 | Results 
 
As laid out in the preceding chapter, I examine outbursts of domestic terrorism that took 
place throughout the first decade of the 21
st
 century in Asia and Africa, subjecting the RFPT to a 
battery of statistical tests in the process.  This produced an n of 928, but since information for all 
variables is not presently available, several cases are automatically dropped from the analysis.
24
  
Nevertheless, the study includes information for most Asian and African states during the period 
under consideration, and as such, the analysis should help shed light on the impact of religious 
freedom on domestic terrorism throughout the non-Western world.  The results of the analysis 
are presented and discussed here in three phases.  The first phase of the analysis relies on logistic 
regression to examine the impact of religious diversity and religious freedom on the occurrence 
of terrorism.  In the second phase, I consider the impact of religious diversity and religious 
freedom on the rate of domestic terrorism, substituting the logit model of the first section for a 
negative binomial approach.  In the final section, I turn to the impact of religious diversity and 
religious freedom on the level of violence produced by these attacks. 
A Logistic Assessment of the RFPT 
Table 2 details the results of the logit analysis.  Models 1-4 are based on terrorism data 
taken from the RDWTI (2016), while Models 5-8 utilize data from the GTD (START 2016).  
Under the first four columns, Models 1 and 2 provide a baseline by which to compare the effects 
of religious freedom and religious diversity on the occurrence of domestic terrorism in Model 3.  





some initial evidence against the first two hypotheses.  Hypothesis 1 seeks to find evidence of 
the clash of civilizations or diversity dividend.  Neither seems present in the RDWTI data.   
Table 2.  Logit Analysis of Domestic Terrorism in Asian and African States, 2000-2009
Predictors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Religious Diversity 0.939 - 0.934 0.948 1.006 - 1.005 0.941
(-0.81) (-0.86) (-0.46) (0.08) (0.07) (-0.49)
Religious Freedom - 0.607 0.601 0.69 - 0.703 0.704 0.435
(-1.10) (-1.12) (-0.42) (-0.95) (-0.95) (-1.21)
Religious Freedom × Religious Diversity - - - 0.968 - - - 1.122
(-0.22) (0.94)
Ethnicity 1.041 1.033 1.038 1.037 1.105 1.102 1.101 1.107
(1.22) (1.00) (1.12) (1.12) (1.55) (1.57) (1.56) (1.54)
Democracy 1.081 * 1.096 * 1.102 * 1.103 * 1.091 ** 1.106 ** 1.105 ** 1.105 **
(2.32) (2.32) (2.36) (2.39) (2.72) (3.10) (2.95) .299
Democracy
2
0.995 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.994 0.994 0.995 0.994
(-0.81) (-0.59) (-0.67) (-0.61) (-1.04) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-1.10)
GDPpcPPP (log) 0.935 0.933 0.937 0.937 0.775 0.777 0.777 -0.775
(-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.44) (-0.45) (-1.58) (-1.57) (-1.57) (-1.59)
Population (log) 1.889 ** 1.779 ** 1.800 ** 1.800 ** 1.955 *** 1.903 *** 1.901 *** 1.898 ***
(2.77) (2.71) (2.78) (2.79) (4.30) (4.12) (4.08) (4.02)
Land Area (log) 1.026 1.082 1.052 1.057 0.976 0.984 0.987 0.973
(0.18) (0.60) (0.39) (0.41) (-0.18) (-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.21)
Russia and Central Assia 0.934 1.060 0.950 0.965 0.358 0.358 0.361 0.337
(-0.13) (0.11) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-1.59) (-1.64) (-1.55) (-1.62)
East Asia 0.031 *** 0.042 *** 0.037 *** 0.038 *** 0.044 ** 0.049 ** 0.049 ** 0.050 **
(-3.74) (-3.43) (-3.54) (-3.52) (-3.13) (-3.04) (-3.01) (-2.94)
South Asia 0.982 1.276 1.104 1.116 3.180 3.328 3.376 3.112
(-0.03) (0.38) (0.15) (0.16) (1.38) (1.45) (1.42) (1.31)
South East Asia 0.401 0.441 0.449 0.451 0.281 * 0.303 0.303 0.301
(-1.53) (-1.35) (-1.32) (-1.31) (-2.01) (-1.84) (-1.83) (-1.87)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.099 *** 0.130 *** 0.117 *** 0.118 *** 0.218 ** 0.247 * 0.249 * 0.241 *
(-3.92) (-3.58) (-3.68) (-3.63) (-2.67) (-2.47) (-2.36) (-2.38)
2001 1.976 * 1.891 * 1.911 * 1.910 * 1.109 1.083 1.1082 1.085
(2.48) (2.34) (2.35) (2.35) (0.30) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
2002 2.250 * 2.169 * 2.197 * 2.195 * 1.028 1.002 1.001 1.006
(2.52) (2.37) (2.41) (2.41) (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
2003 1.660 1.662 1.689 1.686 0.711 0.716 0.715 0.723
(1.56) (1.55) (1.59) (1.58) (-1.03) (-1.01) (-1.01) (-0.98)
2004 1.763 1.784 1.818 1.810 0.386 ** 0.388 ** 0.387 ** 0.396 **
(1.59) (1.58) (1.62) (1.59) (-2.85) (-2.82) (-2.81) (-2.73)
2005 1.434 1.462 1.490 1.484 0.608 0.621 0.621 0.634
(1.03) (1.07) (1.11) (1.09) (-1.49) (-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.34)
2006 1.005 1.014 1.051 1.049 0.703 0.722 0.721 0.730
(0.02) (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) (-1.01) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.89)
2007 1.232 1.271 1.310 1.320 0.750 1.324 0.772 0.757
(0.60) (0.67) (0.75) (0.79) (-0.83) (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.78)
2008 0.976 0.970 1.014 1.016 1.290 1.324 1.320 1.324
(-0.08) (-0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.70) (0.75) (0.75) (0.76)
2009 0.150 *** 0.148 *** 0.15 *** 0.151 *** 0.843 0.8667 0.864 0.838
(-3.17) (-3.41) (-3.34) (-3.07) (0.46) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.46)
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
RDWTI GDT
Note:  N  = 897.  Models report odds ratios with z -scores in parentheses.  Results are clustered by country to allow for Huber-White robust standard errors 
(not shown).  Missing cases were dropped by Stata because values for Polity IV democracy scores for Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine do not 
exist under periods of occupation.  Another version of the fully-specified models (4 and 8) recording missing values as 0 is not shown becuase there was no 





Looking exclusively at Model 1, we see a negative effect that suggests diversity correlates with 
reductions in domestic terrorism, but this evidence cannot substantiate CFS’s earlier findings, as 
there is no real discernable effect.  Model 2 tries to evaluate the expectations of the RFPT, and 
again finds no strong support for the idea that religious freedom reduces domestic terrorism.  
When both variables are included in Model 3, each points in the expected direction, but neither 
gains significance.   
At least part of the problem can be visualized in Figure 4, a plot of first differences using 
Model 4.  A state’s chance of experiencing a domestic terrorist attack, ceteris paribus, declines 
by 6% as Religious Freedom increases from 0 to 1.  As illustrated above though, the enormous 
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Chance of experiencing a domestic terrorist attack (Source: RDWTI).
Figure 4. Plot of first differences. First differences represent discrete changes in predicted 
probabilities. Here, the FDs measure a change from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above it, yielding 
the chance of experiencing a domestic terror attack. These variables are discrete – FD is a change 




the confidence intervals for Religious Diversity and Ethnic Diversity both cross 0, meaning there 
is no sign of the diversity dividend or clashing civilizations in these preliminary results.  While 
this is troubling for Hypotheses 1 and 2 (particularly with regards to the occurrence of terrorism), 
these data do not offer any information about the level of terrorist violence across Asia and 
Africa, so this subject will be addressed shortly.  In the meantime, proponents of the RFPT will 
be similarly disappointed by the findings reported in Model 4.  Here, where I attempt to assess 
the thesis’ neo-Lockean variant, we find no statistically significant results for any of the relevant 
variables. 
Upon reviewing Figure 5, which looks at the predicted probability of experiencing a 
terrorist attack (again based on Model 4), it’s not difficult to explain why.  The directionality of 
the red trend-line, representing the effect of religious freedom, generally conforms to 
expectations, but there are a couple problems that come to light in the graph.  First, the blue line, 
representing religious non-freedom, also trends consistently in a downward direction.  While 
there is some indication that religiously free states have a lower probability of experiencing a 
terrorist attack as the RFPT suggests, the neo-Lockean model depicted in Figure 2 expects 
religious non-freedom to encourage violence as the number of religious groups increases.  Of 
course, this means Figure 5 does seem to offer some tentative support to the diversity dividend, 
as it appears to manifest regardless of the state’s church-state relationship.  Indeed, the 
probability of a religiously non-free state experiencing a terrorist attack drops noticeably with the 
inclusion of each new religious group. 
Nevertheless, this is where the second problem emerges to challenge the interpretation of 
these findings: the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the two trend-lines overlap, meaning 





given the current scope of the data.  Since the overlap of these confidence intervals makes it 
impossible to discern the difference between religious freedom and non-freedom, Hypothesis 3 
cannot be confirmed.  Worse still, is that the confidence intervals start to overlap with zero once 
a society has around 11 major religious groups, meaning that religious freedom and religious 
non-freedom cease to have a distinguishable effect in highly diverse societies.  Together, these 
issues undermine what little support Figure 5 does offer for Hypothesis 3.  Notice that the ability 
of religious freedom to contribute to reductions in domestic terrorism as societies start to become 
religiously diverse (i.e., as the estimated total number of religions increases from 1 to 9) is 
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Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of experiencing a domestic terror attack by church-state 




Some interesting findings do materialize when looking at the bottom of Table 2 though.  
CFS (2009) found no evidence supporting the idea that democracy impacts domestic terrorism in 
Asia and Africa, but democratic states are significantly more likely to experience an attack than 
non-democratic states in both datasets.  This may be because terrorism can exploit an open 
society (Huntington 1996) or because terrorism is the only viable form of violent contestation in 
a democratic state (Ash 2016), but since democracy and religious freedom are supposed to go 
hand-in-hand (r = .5027) this may provide additional, if circumstantial, evidence against the 
RFPT.  Even so, the substantive effect of democracy is small.  Returning to Figure 4, we see that 
the probability of a democratic state experiencing a domestic terror attack only increases by 
about 1%, all other things equal. 
Next, states with a large population experience greater levels of violence, probably 
because there is a greater possibility to achieve a successful mass casualty attack, but this finding 
is not at all surprising.  Finally, there is some regional variation detected in the model, which 
shows that states in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are least prone to experiencing domestic 
terrorism.  During an earlier phase of this project, I found some evidence for the RFPT by 
looking at domestic terrorism in Africa (Herrington 2015).  Perhaps this earlier finding was an 
artifact of the data, resulting from a lack of regional variation.  Since the states of Sub-Saharan 
Africa generally experience less terrorism than any of the others in the data, religious freedom 
might have seemed more important than it apparently really is. 
The data from the right-hand side of Table 2 generally conforms to these findings, but 
this is not that surprising.  While the RDWTI is more conservative than the GTD, the two 
dichotomous variables are still highly correlated (r = 0.5485).  The only noteworthy difference in 




There is almost no distinct annual effect in the GTD data, while more appears on the left side of 
the table.  Since temporal dummies are difficult to interpret, I conducted a likelihood-ratio (LR) 
test of the fully specified models (4 and 8) that compared them to a pair of nested models that 
dropped the temporal variables altogether (not shown).  Of course, the LR test is not necessarily 
a reliable tool when assessing temporal dependence in either dataset, but the results provide at 
least some indication as to how seriously we should take the possible problem of temporal 
dependence in the models.  While bearing in mind the fact that a more sophisticated approach 
should do better, according to the LR test of the GTD data, we get a test statistic (
2
) of 14.19 on 
nine degrees of freedom and a relatively large p-value (prob > 
2
) equaling .1157.  This suggests 
that the temporal dummies add little explanatory power to a constrained model that excludes 
them.  According to the test of the RDWTI data, by contrast, the temporal dummies create a 
statistically significant improvement to the fit of the model.  With a small p-value close to zero, 
even when rounded to the fourth decimal place, the LR test indicates that temporal dependence 
may be a real problem on the left side of Table 2.  Unfortunately, I have no theoretical 
explanation to explain the impact of time on domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa at present. 
Analyzing the Attack Rate 
Although the prior section concentrates on whether or not religiously free states have a 
lower probability of experiencing a domestic terrorist attack than their more restrictive 
counterparts, the results in Table 2 tell us little about the moderating potential of religious 
freedom.  Since the RFPT expects groups operating in an open religious economy to temper their 
positions while competing for adherents (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Smith 1776), it is 
necessary to consider whether or not religiously free states in Asia and Africa experience fewer 




this phase of the analysis, I turn to this question with a series of negative binomial models that 
help explain the rate of domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa using the same variables as found 
in Table 2. 
Since the first phase of this study provided little evidence in favor of the RFPT, it is 
somewhat unsurprising that religious freedom, as illustrated in Table 3, consistently fails to 
contribute significantly to reductions in terrorist attacks.  Intriguingly, the direction of the effect 
in all six relevant models does point in the theorized direction, but only in Model 11 does 
religious freedom obtain statistical significance.  This is the first time religious freedom has had 
a noteworthy impact on terrorism reductions, but the robustness of this finding is in doubt since 
Model 15 fails to substantiate the result with data drawn from the GTD (START 2016).  It 
would, therefore, constitute an act of intellectual dishonesty to hold the finding in Model 11 up 
as evidence in favor of the RFPT.  Although I also measure violence with the annual casualty 
rate in the third phase of this analysis, it is starting to look as if there is not enough evidence to 
support Hypothesis 2, the central claim of the RFPT on investigation in this study. 
Intriguingly though, evidence for the “diversity dividend” does emerge in Table 3.  As 
seen in Models 9, 11, and 12, higher levels of religious diversity are correlated with reductions in 
domestic terrorism, a finding robust even to the inclusion of Religious Freedom in Models 11 
and 12.  However, unlike CFS (2009), there is no evidence of the diversity dividend emerging 
from increases in politically salient ethnic groups, and incidentally, findings on the right side of 
the table clearly clash with CFS’s claims.  Increases in the number of politically relevant ethnic 
groups actually lead to increases in domestic terrorism, according to the data drawn from the 
GTD.  Taken together with the results on religious diversity from the right-side of Table 3, 





inconclusive.  Add to this the weak empirical support for the RFPT’s Smithian contention 
(Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Smith 1776) that participation in a diverse ideational marketplace  
Table 3.  Negative Binomial Analysis of Domestic Terror in Asian and African States, 2000-2009
Predictors
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Religious Diversity -0.280** - -0.306*** -0.321*** -0.130 - -0.130 -0.181*  
(0.09) (0.08) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Religious Freedom - -1.027 -1.128* -1.656 - -0.071 -0.036 -1.381
(0.55) (0.52) (0.97) (0.4) (0.37) (1.04)
Religious Freedom × Religious Diversity - - - 0.129 - - - 0.313
(0.19) (0.23)
Ethnicity 0.001 -0.028 -0.01 -0.009 0.049* 0.032 0.049* 0.054** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Democracy 0.139*** 0.155*** 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.100***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Democracy
2 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.014* -0.013* -0.014* -0.018** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDPpcPPP (log) -0.2 0.076 0.073 0.088 0.048 0.063 0.052 0.133
(0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Population (log) 1.087*** 0.970*** 1.128*** 1.102*** 0.829*** 0.789*** 0.827*** 0.759***
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.2)
Land Area (log) -0.218 -0.026 -0.27 -0.271 -0.168 -0.056 -0.168 -0.154
(0.2) (0.19) (0.19) (0.2) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)
Russia and Central Assia -1.576* -0.867 -1.296* -1.328* -2.254*** -2.007** -2.246*** -2.360***
(0.67) (0.68) (0.64) (0.63) (0.68) (0.64) (0.67) (0.64)
East Asia -5.471*** -4.831*** -5.292*** -5.210*** -5.337*** -5.022*** -5.324*** -5.187***
(0.77) (0.79) (0.77) (0.79) (0.72) (0.76) (0.75) (0.79)
South Asia -0.627 0.235 -0.279 -0.291 -0.015 0.218 -0.004 0.134
(0.82) (0.74) (0.72) (0.71) (0.67) (0.66) (0.66) (0.65)
South East Asia -1.368 -0.638 -0.767 -0.792 -0.810 -0.769 -0.790 -0.775
(0.8) (0.83) (0.76) (0.77) (0.69) (0.72) (0.69) (0.69)
Sub-Saharan Africa -3.633*** -2.545*** -3.053*** -3.062*** -1.709* -1.421* -1.692* -1.640*  
(0.79) (0.77) (0.75) (0.74) (0.69) (.68) (0.69) (0.66)
2001 0.696* 0.765* 0.749* 0.753* -0.036 -0.033 -0.035 -0.048
(0.29) (0.31) (0.34) (0.35) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26)
2002 0.912*** 0.706* 0.822** 0.805** -0.525 -0.531 -0.531 -0.603*  
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.3) (0.3)
2003 0.747* 0.658* 0.658* 0.645* -0.679* -0.655* -0.686* -0.766** 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
2004 1.081** 0.835* 0.910* 0.912* -1.222*** -1.222*** -1.232*** -1.285***
(0.36) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
2005 1.165*** 0.804** 1.021** 1.036** -0.729* -0.774* -0.737* -0.766*  
(0.33) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
2006 1.519*** 1.459** 1.557*** 1.564*** -0.356 -0.350 -0.357 -0.462
(0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
2007 1.714*** 1.783*** 1.544** 1.478** -0.271 -0.298 -0.277 -0.519
(0.52) (0.54) (0.48) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.41)
2008 2.107*** 2.164*** 1.905*** 1.815*** 0.638 0.502 0.626 0.492
(0.53) (0.55) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43)
2009 -0.345 -0.298 -0.519 -0.600 0.233 0.173 0.225 -0.048
(0.71) (0.72) (0.61) (0.59) (0.43) (0.4) (0.4) (0.41)
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
RDWTI GDT
Note:  N  (RDWTI) = 887; N  (GDT) = 897.  Models report slope coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Missing cases were dropped by Stata.  






should encourage extremists to moderate, and Hypotheses 1 and 2 both seem to lose out.  Of 
course, the neo-Lockean variant finds no support in Table 3 either. 
When we turn our attention to the control variables though, democracy again seems to 
win out.  Here, we see that democratic societies are not just more prone to experiencing a 
terrorist attack; they are more likely to experience a greater number of domestic attacks!  This 
finding is consistent across all eight models in Table 3, and as illustrated in Figure 6, democracy 
has a much larger substantive impact than it did in Figure 4.  In fact, based on Model 16, and 
holding all else constant, states with higher Polity scores have a 20% greater chance of 
experiencing a domestic terrorist attack than do states with comparatively low Polity scores.  The 
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Chance of experiencing a domestic terrorist attack (Source: GTD).
Figure 6. Plot of first differences. First differences represent discrete changes in predicted 
probabilities. Here, the FDs measure a change from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above it, yielding 
the chance of experiencing a domestic terror attack. These variables are discrete – FD is a change 




data from the right side of Table 3.  Though this finding is not robust to the RDWTI data, it 
indicates that anocratic regimes, which are usually more prone to instability (Vreeland 2008), are 
likely to experience fewer domestic terrorist attacks than democratic states, but more than 
autocratic states (also see Figure 7 below). 
Population again materializes as a significant predictor of domestic terrorism in both 
models.  More highly populated states are at risk of experiencing a greater number of attacks, 
presumably because they offer a larger pool of potential targets.  A similar assumption lies 
behind risk assessments for urban areas.  According to a report by the RAND Corporation 
(Willis, et. al 2005), this makes it necessary to consider the possibility that population density or 
density weighted population might make for better predictors.  It is unclear if these factors, 
which are applicable at the urban level, may be relevant at the national level though.  I ran a 
separate model looking at both, but neither variable was found significant.  They are reported in 
the Appendix, excluded from this analysis to avoid the appearance of malicious data mining.  It 
is worth noting that the inclusion of these variables allows all three independent variables 
(Religious Diversity, Religious Freedom, and the interaction term to gain significance, but as 
illustrated in the Appendix, the substantive effect of these variables is trivial.  As with the 
evidence found earlier in Model 11, holding these findings up in support of the RFPT would be 
misleading at best, and intellectually dishonest at worst, especially since the inclusion of either of 
these variables into the relevant models rests on shaky theoretical underpinnings. 
 Finally, turning to the regional variables, the findings generally conform to those found in 
Table 2.  Sub-Saharan African states are not just at a lower risk of experiencing terrorist attacks 
in general, those that do experience such violence are likely to experience fewer attacks than 




of being attacked by their own citizens, those that are attacked experience fewer than those that 
are attacked in other regions.  One additional finding stands out: Russia and the Central Asian 
states also experience fewer attacks than their non-regional neighbors.  Table 2 gave no 
indication that these states were less likely to experience an attack than their non-regional 
neighbors, but the fact that this finding appears in 7 out of 8 of the models in Table 3 suggests 
that it is robust. 
The RFPT and Domestic Terror Casualties 
 Table 4 looks at terrorist violence in another light, as the DV shifts from terrorist attacks 
to the annual casualty rate.  The first important finding of note is that religious freedom still lacks 
significance in these final models.  Taken together with the previous 16 models, this suggests 
that religious freedom may not be quite the panacea for the world’s problems as the RFPT 
suggests—at least where domestic terrorism is concerned, anyway.  This is particularly 
noteworthy, as even Locke, Smith, and Madison expect governmental deregulation of the 
religious landscape to encourage moderation.  Next, Models 17-20 continue to offer support for 
the diversity dividend.  States with a greater level of religious diversity experience fewer terror-
related casualties when they are attacked than states with fewer religious groups, and religious 
regulation matters not.  As seen in Model 20, the neo-Lockean variant of the RFPT articulated in 
Hypothesis 3 finds no support.  Unfortunately, these findings are not replicated in the GTD data 
on the right-hand side of Table 4.  Still, the effects presented in Models 21-24 point in a direction 
consistent with the diversity dividend, offering a relatively exhaustive refutation of the clash of 
civilizations.  These findings may also clash with Mia Bloom’s (2005) theory of outbidding, 
which suggests that terrorists in a crowded market will become increasingly violent as they vie 





Table 4.  Negative Bimonial Analysis of Domestic Terror Casualties in Asian and African States, 2000-2009
Predictors
Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24
Religious Diversity -0.253** - -0.279** -0.283** -0.144 - -0.144 -0.164   
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)   
Religious Freedom - -0.795 -0.956 -1.529 - -0.140 -0.116 -1.045   
(0.64) (0.58) (1.80) (0.45) (0.43) (1.49)   
Religious Freedom × Religious Diversity - - - 0.138 - - - 0.225   
(0.41) (0.34) 
Ethnicity 0.026 -0.009 0.017 0.019 0.101*** 0.079** 0.101*** 0.106***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)   
Democracy 0.114** 0.142** 0.145*** 0.139** 0.107** 0.114** 0.111** 0.102*  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   
Democracy
2 -0.013 -0.010 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016* -0.013 -0.016* -0.018*  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
GDPpcPPP (log) -0.625 -0.419 -0.409 -0.379 -0.426 -0.416 -0.409 -0.355   
(0.36) (0.42) (0.35) (0.37) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.34)   
Population (log) 1.609*** 1.475*** 1.604*** 1.565*** 1.197*** 1.170*** 1.186*** 1.124***
(0.40) (0.41) (0.39) (0.43) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24)   
Land Area (log) -0.413 -0.141 -0.445 -0.432 -0.288 -0.149 -0.285 -0.263   
(0.28) (0.25) (0.28) (0.30) (0.20) (0.16) (0.19) (0.20)   
Russia and Central Assia -2.947*** -2.270* -2.625** -2.647** -3.679*** -3.369*** -3.652*** -3.700***
(0.81) (0.90) (0.83) (0.82) (0.75) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74)   
East Asia -9.839*** -8.911*** -9.503*** -9.411*** -6.930*** -6.653*** -6.922*** -6.892***
(1.04) (1.09) (1.01) (1.10) (1.04) (1.03) (1.05) (1.06)   
South Asia -2.225 -1.338 -1.863 -1.791 -1.554 -1.229 -1.517 -1.348   
(1.15) (1.18) (1.09) (1.13) (0.89) (0.89) (0.88) (0.94)   
South East Asia -2.734* -2.052 -2.109* -2.103 -2.266** -2.193** -2.206** -2.179** 
(1.09) (1.18) (1.07) (1.08) (0.81) (0.85) (0.83) (0.84)   
Sub-Saharan Africa -4.400*** -3.532** -3.990*** -3.976*** -2.810** -2.431** -2.760** -2.691** 
(1.06) (1.16) (1.05) (1.05) (0.90) (0.92) (0.91) (0.94)   
2001 2.273* 2.528** 2.894** 2.966** 0.680 0.606 0.721 0.758   
(0.92) (0.93) (1.06) (1.09) (0.59) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55)   
2002 1.267** 1.341** 1.162* 1.164* -0.230 -0.218 -0.224 -0.239   
(0.44) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.47)   
2003 1.010* 1.184* 0.989* 0.999* -0.826* -0.787* -0.832* -0.879*  
(0.45) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.40) (0.38) (0.40) (0.40)   
2004 2.301*** 2.113*** 2.181*** 2.176*** -0.939 -1.035* -0.960 -0.936   
(0.62) (0.59) (0.65) (0.65) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.52)   
2005 1.246** 0.879* 1.085* 1.087* -0.784 -0.921* -0.797 -0.787   
(0.42) (0.38) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.42) (0.45) (0.46)   
2006 0.740 0.725 0.799 0.783 -0.530 -0.565 -0.519 -0.608   
(0.50) (0.51) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.48)   
2007 1.199* 1.221* 1.055* 0.997 -0.386 -0.487 -0.384 -0.558   
(0.54) (0.58) (0.50) (0.54) (0.51) (0.49) (0.52) (0.55)   
2008 2.164*** 1.943*** 1.962*** 1.895*** 0.345 0.091 0.304 0.286   
(0.55) (0.58) (0.53) (0.57) (0.56) (0.50) (0.53) (0.56)   
2009 -0.218 -0.270 -0.490 -0.540 -0.169 -0.207 -0.196 -0.333   
(0.56) (0.60) (0.51) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53) (0.50) (0.53)   
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
RDWTI GDT
Note:  N  (RDWTI) = 887; N  (GDT) = 897.  Models report slope coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Missing cases were dropped by Stata.  
Another version of the fully-specified models (4 and 8) recoding missing values as 0 is not shown becuase there was no noticeable change in the main 




Bloom’s theory deals with the number of perpetrators in a society, rather than the diversity of 
their audience.  It’s unclear if the number of religious groups in a society can really serve as a 
proxy for perpetrators, though the market-based approach might suggest they can. 
Nevertheless, the effect of Ethnicity that manifests on the right-hand side of the Table 
could offer support for Bloom’s ideas, and evidence against the diversity dividend.  Of course, 
it’s again important to acknowledge that ethnicity and religion are empirically distinct categories, 
but it is striking that the effects of these two variables point in different directions because both 
hinted at the diversity dividend in CFS’s (2009) original study.  As with Table 3 though, these 
findings are not replicated on both sides of Table 4.  Next, living in Russia, Central Asia, East 
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa continues to come with the benefit of reduced violence, as the 
states in these regions experience attacks that result in fewer terror-related casualties.  Though it 
is not shown, a model replacing missing Polity IV scores with 0 showed South and South East 
Asian states to yield fewer casualties as well, but this model did not change in any other regard. 
Finally, population and democracy are shown, once more, to be significant predictors of 
terrorist violence.  Highly populated and open states are thus more likely to experience deadlier 
domestic terror attacks than their low-population or non-democratic counterparts.  Perhaps the 
most interesting facet of this finding is depicted in Figure 7.  Although democracy is consistently 
associated with increased domestic terrorism, it’s important not to take this as if democracies 
exist in a vacuum.  Anocracies are typically associated with instability (Vreeland 2008), and 
instability appears as the chief predictor of terrorism in CFS’s (2009) analysis.  Astonishingly 
though, the curvilinear relationship depicted for attack casualties matches that depicted for the 
total number of attacks in both datasets.  As such, Figure 7 shows that the rate of domestic 





most susceptible.  Of course, the confidence intervals do grow quite wide as regimes become 
more liberal, with the confidence intervals in the top right quadrant even crossing zero.  
However, this can be attributed to the fact that democracies represent a minority in Asia and 
Africa.  Indeed, autocracies and anocracies account for 619/928 country years in the data.  
Finally, that autocracies stand out as the least violent is quite unsurprising, given that repressive 
regimes have long been credited for their ability to act swiftly and punitively in response to such 
threats (Hamilton and Hamilton 1983). 
Concluding Thoughts 
 As reported in Table 5, there is virtually no good news for proponents of the RFPT.  
Neither Hypotheses 2 nor 3 receives any meaningful support in the preceding analyses.  This 
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Indeed, Hypothesis 1A is the only prediction articulated in Chapter 4 to receive even limited 
support.  The battery of statistical models presented throughout the three phases of this analysis 
provide for a relatively exhaustive examination of the effects of religious freedom and religious 
diversity on domestic terrorism in Asia and Africa over the first decade of the 21
st
 century.  
Using two different terrorism datasets (RDWTI 2016; START 2016), as well as religious 
freedom data from the U.S. State Department (2000-2009) and demographic data from the CIA 
(2000-2009), I find no empirical evidence supporting the RFPT, and although Models 9-12, 16, 
and 17-20 indicate that religious diversity is associated with a decline in domestic terrorist 
violence, this evidence may be an artifact of the data from the RDWTI.  Without evidence from 
the GTD, which reports a greater number of attacks per country per year, supporting this finding, 
it’s difficult to determine if religious diversity really has a meaningful impact on domestic 
terrorism. 
 Although this study focuses exclusively on domestic terrorism, these findings present a 
real dilemma for the RFPT.  So, where do we go from here?  As noted in Chapter 4, religious 
freedom, particularly the way it has been theorized and measured in this analysis, is a Western 
concept.  If the RFPT does not have empirical muster in the non-Western world, perhaps it’s 
Table 5. Summary of Hypotheses and Findings





Hypothesis 3B Diversity under conditions of religious non-
freedom will result in increases  in the 
occurrence and level of terrorist violence.
Increased levels of diversity will result in 
reductions  in the occurrence and level of 
terrorist violence.
Increased levels of diversity will result in 
increases  in the occurrence and level of 
terrorist violence.
The presence of religious freedom will 
result in reductions  in the occurrence 
and level of terrorist violence.
Diversity under conditions of religious 
freedom will result in reductions  in the 
occurrence and level of terrorist violence.
According to Locke (1667; 1689), 
religious intolerance is is the cause of 
violence in diverse societies.
Limited Support.  The diversity dividend 
correlates with reductions in violence in 
the RDWTI, but not the GDT.
No Support.  When religious diversity is 
significant, it has a negative effect on 
terrorism.
No Support.  The effect of religious 
freedom points in the anticipated 
direction, but lacks significance.
No support.  The effect of religious 
freedom across religions lacks 
significance.
No support.  The effect of religious non-
freedom across religions does not 
increase violence.
According to CFS (2009), "the diversity 
dividend" creates a de facto  system of 
cultural checks and balances. 
According to Huntington (1993a; 1996), 
clashing civilizations will render 
multicultural societies prone to violence.
According to the RFPT (e.g., Farr 
2008), religiously free states will see 
major reductions in violence of all kinds.
According to Locke (1667; 1689), 
religious toleration is key to ameliorating 




time for scholars to critically reevaluate the religious freedom research agenda, particularly with 
regard to its neocolonial implications.  It is towards this end—the problematization of the 





6 | Problematizing the Religious Freedom Peace Thesis 
 
 Emphasizing the special role of religious freedom in human social life as the “first 
freedom,” the RFPT proposes a grievance-based model of terrorism and political violence that 
places the onus for such violence on religious regulation and persecution.  Proponents of the 
RFPT might thus be unsurprised to learn how the religious persecution of the Branch Davidians, 
as noted in Chapter 1, served as fodder for McVeigh, who cited the ATF’s siege at Waco to 
justify his twisted deeds in 1995.  They might likewise find the fact that ISIS militants see 
religious persecution as the key to enlisting “gray zone” Muslims in their war with the West 
more than a little disturbing.  Yet, the idea that grievances matter is hardly new to the terrorism 
literature: Martha Crenshaw (1981: 383) described “the existence of concrete grievances among 
an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against 
by the majority” as the “first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism” three 
and a half decades ago. 
More recently, research on domestic terrorism has tried to highlight the role of a number 
of similar factors in the production of political violence.  Ghatak’s (2014) study finds 
discrimination and increased trade in the face of discrimination to be important predictors of 
domestic terrorism in South Asia.  Meanwhile, he and Aaron Gold (Ghatak and Gold 2015) find 
that high- and middle-income countries are especially prone to terrorism when minority 
discrimination presents itself as a major social problem, and Seung Whan Choi and Piazza 
(2016) suggest that the political exclusion of minority ethnic groups represents a better 




 Thus, it would seem that there isn’t anything particularly novel about the idea that 
grievances play a role in producing terrorism, but what is unique about the RFPT is its attribution 
of the state’s relationship with religious groups as the problem driving political violence.  An 
issue arises though, when we realize that the 2015 attacks on Paris were themselves not actually 
motivated by perceptions of religious persecution.  In fact, ISIS’s official statement instead 
attributes its attack to the fact that Paris is at the heart of Western “abominations and perversion” 
(Jones 2015), while the issue with Islamophobia in the U.S. and Europe more accurately 
concerns the West’s response to these attacks.  Even McVeigh, a right-wing, anti-government 
extremist had ulterior motives, suggesting that his was a response to government overreach, in 
general (Durham 1996).  As such, Piazza’s (2015b) work on rightwing terrorism in the U.S. 
limns several potentially important insights into what may have been driving McVeigh and his 
coconspirators.  That is, Piazza shows right wing groups to be motivated by increases in 
abortion, female labor force participation, and Democratic control of the White House.  Of 
course, the study demonstrates some challenges to the comparative study of domestic terrorism 
by highlighting such context-specific factors, but it nevertheless presents a foil to the explanation 
of these attacks offered from the perspective of the RFPT. 
 Indeed, even the case of Malawi, which epitomizes Applebee’s notion of religious 
ambivalence so well, stands out as problematic to the narrative of the RFPT.  While proponents 
of the RFPT might point to the democratic and interfaith activism of Malawi’s religious 
communities as a sign of the prosocial side of ambivalence, it’s important to consider the fact 
that the arrests of Malawian Catholic bishops represents a clear episode of religious liberty 
violations.  In the face of a government crackdown on their religious leaders, the RFPT might 




Joseph Kony or developing their own LRA.  That the religious communities of Malawi came 
together and founded a pro-democratic political action group rather than allowing their nation to 
disintegrate into sectarian strife as has happened in Uganda could not have been anticipated. 
This brings us to the problematic implications of this study.  The preceding analyses 
yielded a series of results that confound the expectations of the RFPT.  Although I find evidence, 
like CFS (2009), that religious heterogeneity seems to play a role in muting the general level of 
violence experienced by Asian and African states, this finding is problematic for two reasons.  
To begin with, violence—which was measured by the number of annual domestic terrorist 
attacks and the number of casualties resulting from those attacks—tells us little about the 
propensity for a state to experience terrorism in the first place.  As reported in Models 1-8 of 
Table 2, religious diversity does not have a statistically significant impact on the occurrence of 
domestic terrorist attacks.  Second, although it appears that the number of attacks and casualties 
are reduced in religiously diverse societies, this finding is limited to data produced by the RAND 
Corporation (2016).  It could not be corroborated with data from the GTD (Berkebile 2015; 
START 2016), suggesting that there may not really be a diversity dividend at work.  Findings 
from the GTD also contradict CFS’s (2009) notion of a diversity dividend where ethnicity is 
concerned, as increases in ethnic diversity are associated with increased levels of domestic 
terrorist violence. 
Also concerning for the RFPT is the fact that presence of religious freedom in a society 
does not seem to lead to reductions in domestic terrorism.  Of course, this does not mean that the 
RFPT has been invalidated since this study focuses exclusively on the impact of religious liberty 
on domestic terrorism, but it certainly does cast skepticism on the claims that religious freedom 




drawn from the non-Western world—Asia and Africa—it stands to reason that proponents of the 
RFPT should temper some of their claims and take criticisms of their approach more seriously.  
While Farr and others increasingly treat religious freedom as a panacea for the world’s social and 
political ills—a force multiplier capable of, inter alia, fostering democracy and reducing political 
violence—these findings obviously problematize this approach in several ways, especially where 
its normative implications are concerned. 
 For example, the findings reported in Chapter 5 add weight to Hurd’s (2013; 2015) 
criticisms of the religious freedom research agenda.  She highlights the normative consequences 
of international religious freedom advocacy, among which is a tendency to over privilege and 
thus reify the religious dimension of intergroup conflicts, as is the case with the Rohingya people 
of Myanmar.  Hurd trenchantly demonstrates that the focus on the Rohingya’s Muslim identity 
has led many to depict their plight as one of religious oppression, but this consequently misses 
the fact that the discrimination leveled at the Rohingya “is complex and multifaceted,” with 
“ethnic, racial, economic, political, postcolonial, and national” dimensions, ultimately making 
the group’s problems even more difficult to solve (Hurd 2015, 46-47).  As this chapter therefore 
makes clear, scholars and advocates of religious freedom abroad must be cognizant of the 
potential unintended consequences that may flow from their policy preferences. 
Liberal Imperialism and Military Humanitarianism 
For a body of research that has already been described by one diplomatic historian as a 
“faith-inflected version of democratic peace theory” (Preston 2013, 11), this should be a 
particularly salient concern.  After all, the DPT provided the intellectual and normative basis for 
President W. Bush’s doctrine of preventative warfare.  In other words, the invasion in Iraq—part 




the “law-like” idea that democracies don’t fight one another (Cox 2013; Smith 2007; Steele 
2010).  This is not to suggest that religious freedom advocacy abroad will lead to violence on 
such scales though.  Obviously, regime change entails a far greater expenditure of resources than 
the focused promotion of a single human right.  Yet, scholars must nevertheless exercise caution, 
even with such seemingly low stakes inhering from the implications of their scholarship, because 
things can still go awry when a foreign policy goal is based on the promotion of a single human 
right.  Just take the invasion of Afghanistan as an example.  Inderpal Grewal (2005) describes 
operations there as a kind of militant humanitarianism thanks to President Bush’s efforts to frame 
the conflict, at least in part, as a fight for women’s rights.  Other scholars critical of the 
appropriation of feminist theory take this further, asking how initiatives meant to protect women 
will “reproduce violence,” even noting that, when taken to the extreme, these kinds of “human 
rights [policies] can be used to justify military intervention” (Bumiller 2008: 136). 
Those scholars that see the DPT as the foundation of the U.S.’s highly militarized foreign 
policy of liberal imperialism generally see its genesis at the end of the Cold War (Cox 2013; 
Smith 2007; Steele 2010), but as Preston (2013) notes, religious freedom and democratic values 
have long been paired as an important normative justification for warfare in presidential rhetoric, 
at least since Franklin Roosevelt led the U.S. into World War II.  Fox and Sandler (2004) suggest 
that this behavior could be much older, as they see these outbursts of liberal imperialism as an 
attempt to export the American Revolution.  Religious revolutions often pose the potential for 
contagion, as how Iran has indirectly inspired or directly supported several fundamentalist 
movements since 1979.  Of course, Fox and Sandler acknowledge that non-religious revolutions 
like the American War for Independence and the Russian Revolution can also inspire attempts at 




liberal imperialism—and a concordant commitment to religious freedom, like the nation’s 
broader dedication to human rights—may be thoroughly ingrained into the U.S. identity. 
In the autumn of 1774, American revolutionaries began reaching out to the people of 
Quebec, trying to entice them into the colonial rebellion against England.  In an address to the 
people of Canada, Americans highlighted the rights they shared as subjects of the crown: trial by 
jury, freedom of the press, and political representation, to name only three.  But the letter went 
on to denounce the Quebec Act of 1774, legislation granting Canadians the right to practice their 
Catholicism openly.  This legislation served as a prominent example of parliamentary overreach, 
the Americans reasoned, because Parliament never had the authority to grant the people of 
Quebec their liberty of conscience or religion in the first place.  These were God-given rights, 
and if Parliament could usurp the authority of God to grant such rights legislatively, they could 
certainly usurp the power to take them away.  For this reason, the Americans called on their 
neighbors to the north to help resist British aggression by joining in the fight—it was the only 
way to truly protect their religious freedom!  Unfortunately, the Anglo-Americans of the colonial 
period, like Locke, were known for their anti-Catholicism, and when the Quebecoise learned of 
America’s hypocrisy, Quebec opted against revolution (Farrelly 2012). 
 American “outreach” to the Canadians didn’t end there though.  As Maura Jane Farrelly 
(2012: 250) observes, the failure of diplomacy in 1774 “[…] occasioned the first act of military 
aggression by a quasi-independent American republic [...].”  Thus, in December of the following 
year, the American colonial military invaded and conquered Montreal, presumably attempting to 
forcibly liberate Quebec from England’s tyranny.  When the military advanced on Quebec City 
shortly thereafter, however, it was routed by British forces, giving rise to another diplomatic 




Franklin, as well as Charles and John Carrol, departed for occupied Montreal in an effort to 
entice the Catholics of Quebec to voluntarily join the American colonies in their revolt against 
England.  The Carrols were from Catholic Maryland, and thus shared the faith of the Quebecoise, 
but the mission would nonetheless go down in the history books as a failure (Farrelly 2012).  
Sure, American history might have been very different if the revolution had successfully 
recruited the people of Quebec at one of these three junctures, but the example stands out as 
significant just the same because it illustrates that the U.S. has been engaged in what might be 
interpreted as liberal imperialism (and religious freedom diplomacy) since its founding. 
 Advocates of a strong religious freedom foreign policy might ultimately counter that their 
intentions are good though (Steele 2010), and that they would never endorse the kinds of militant 
humanitarianism on display in Quebec, Afghanistan, or Iraq.  But as Westerners, we might still 
be inclined to ask who would really dissent from the idea that religious liberty presents a strong 
normative good.  However, the operative phrase is “as Westerners.”  Recall that not only does 
the RFPT draw heavily on the American Founding Fathers, Smith, or Voltaire (and now Locke), 
but even Huntington (1993a) concedes that religious freedom and the separation of church and 
state are Western constructs.  It is therefore important to ask if these ideas really can be divorced 
from their neocolonial or neo-imperial baggage prior to export.  More importantly, one should 
remember that the American foreign policy elite responsible for implementing IRFA’s protocols 
have a job guided more by protecting American interests than by the needs of a people oppressed 
in some distant land.  Once in the hands of the State Department, something as “innocent” or 
well-intended as the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom becomes an instrument 
of America’s pervasive power.  Yes, the human rights regime may contribute to normative 




normative “goods” cannot be separated from the panoptic power structures of American 
hegemony in which they are produced (Steele and Amoureux 2006).  As such, intentions matter 
little.  The RFPT, like the DPT can be usurped by powerbrokers to suit their own ends, so 
scholars must ultimately be cognizant of the normative implications of their work from the get-
go, and that means it’s time for the RFPT to take questions of cultural imperialism seriously. 
Cultural Imperialism 
Although the RFPT is beset by criticisms that IRFA may be unconstitutional, or that 
religious freedom advocacy abroad could constitute an act of cultural imperialism (Danchin 
2010a; 2010b; Hurd 2010; Sullivan 2010), scholars like Farr (2011; 2013) do troubling little to 
address these problems.  In fact, rather than critically interrogating the normative implications of 
the RFPT, Farr (2011; 2013) generally blames the “cultural imperialism” critique for 
undermining American religious freedom policy.  On one hand, he blames the critique, which he 
simply dismisses as “internally inconsistent,” for eroding the efficacy of IRFA in the Islamic 
world (Farr 2011: 68).  On the other, he laments the fact that similar issues have been raised in 
the Foreign Service’s training programs when instructors ask if the U.S. really has the right to 
impose its own values on other nations.  Since the American Foreign Service isn’t adequately 
being taught about the importance of religion in world affairs, he reasons, these diplomats “have 
the right to wonder whether they are being trained to […] protest the religious freedom policy 
mandated by Congress” rather than being trained to execute these policies (Farr 2013: 38). 
Dismissing the imperialism-critique will require more than complaints and nebulous 
assertions about internal inconsistency though, especially since legitimate questions about 
American cultural imperialism originate primarily from abroad (Cozad 2005; Farr 2013), where 




concern for the persecution of Christians and when one considers that many members of the 
Christian Right formed part of the legislative coalition responsible for the passage of IRFA 
(Hertzke 2004), this criticism becomes more credible.  Although Allen Hertzke (2004) believes 
the legislation was adequately broadened to cover people of all religious traditions, there is still 
something to the criticism that IRFA was or is meant to open states previously closed to 
missionary activity, and since the peddlers of religion have long been seen as agents of 
imperialism, it’s fair to say that the multi-faith focus of the legislation does not address this 
concern.  In fact, the religious freedom research agenda’s emphasis on the religiously unfree arc 
of Islam (Hertzke 2004), the dominant geosocial territory in the 10/40 window, and the 
persecution of Christian missionaries that goes on in this region (Hoover 2009), should only 
exacerbate these concerns. 
Although Hertzke (2004) tries to debunk the imperialism-critique in a more thoughtful 
manner than Farr (2011; 2013), he argues that the association of Christian missionaries with the 
agents of imperialism (like Spanish Conquistadors) is hardly more than a manifestation of left-
wing hostility against religion in general, and Christianity in particular.  Of course, it is true that 
some on the left are deeply suspicious of religion (i.e., Harris 2004; Maher 2008; Marx 1844), 
but many affiliated with the Christian Left also take these concerns very seriously.  Writing for 
the Christian Left publication, Sojourners magazine, religious freedom advocate David Griffith 
(2010) writes that he sees the “truth in the charge that missionary activity can damage 
communities where missionary methods are culturally insensitive, patronizing, or disrespectful.”  
Additionally, Jim Wallis (2016), perhaps the leading figure on the Christian Left in the U.S., 
views the imperial institutions that gave rise to the U.S., which includes the missionaries who 




this day (Wallis 2016).  In fact, argues Wallis (2008: 260), the West’s experience with terrorism, 
Nazism, and imperialism all demonstrate that “[a] biblical view of the human condition must 
take [such] evil very seriously.”  The question, Wallis adds, is not whether or not such evils 
really exist, but instead how to confront them.  
Consequently, dismissing the charges of cultural imperialism as outbursts of left-wing 
hostility comes off as somewhat disingenuous.  One does not even need to point to the concerted 
efforts by U.S. government agencies and Christian missionaries (Wallis 2016)—or the efforts of 
their Spanish antecedents (Hertzke 2004)—to disrupt Native American culture to see how real 
this problem is.  In fact, missionaries continued to play an important part in the production of 
American power well into the 20
th
 century.  Sarah Ruble (2012) even connects the American 
missionary enterprise to the same spirit of Wilsonian internationalism at the heart of the liberal 
imperialist democratic peace project (Cox 2013; Smith 2007), and this is exactly why countries 
like Egypt (Sharkey 2008) and India (Cozad 2005) fidget uncomfortably under the thumb of 
American pressure to liberalize their religious freedom policies.
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Even when speaking out on moral problems not directly related to missionary activity, 
Ruble (2012) argues, Western Christians run the risk of accusations that they are functioning as 
instruments of American imperialism.  The outcry over Uganda’s anti-homosexual legislation 
serves as a case in point.  When Christian Evangelicals denounced the draconian proposal as a 
violation of human rights, some Ugandans, who are of course quite familiar with the role of 
missionaries in Western imperialism,
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 responded by questioning the international community’s 
attempts to infantilize their nation (Ruble 2012: 158-159), which is important because, as Uday 




effort to justify civilizational projects that systematically exclude colonized populations from 
public life. 
The Non-Neutrality of Tolerance 
 Ultimately, the point is that toleration is never neutral (Brown 2008; Brunstetter 2010; 
Gray 2015).  When tolerance is granted by a majority to minority groups, as it often is, there is 
often an ulterior motive (Brown 2008).  For those connected to the Christian Right agitating for 
the passage of IRFA, that motive may have been about alleviating persecution for coreligionists 
or opening the 10/40 window to evangelization.  For American policymakers, IRFA policy may 
just be another extension of national power.  Whatever the case may be, tolerance is not usually 
practiced for tolerance’s sake, but instead as a means to an end.  Philip Gray (2015) points out 
that toleration requires some level of conformity and that one can usually find the limits of 
tolerance where deviants threaten the majority’s worldview.  This might not be that surprising 
for advocates of the RFPT; even Farr (2013) admits that “religious liberty “imposes its own 
limits, the most important of which is equality under the law.”  However, this is perceived as a 
limitation on the rights of a majority since it requires acceptance of a minority as equal.  In other 
words, that the rule of law must not be used in a religiously free society to restrict the rights of a 
religious minority (Farr and Hoover 2009) does not adequately reveal the limits of tolerance 
inherent in IRFA.  
 Perhaps more revealing is the claim that minorities cannot “exercise their rights in ways 
which unduly limit or abrogate the rights of majorities” (Farr and Hoover 2009: 16), and here 
Farr’s (2013: 39) use of scare quotes to describe the notion of same-sex “marriage” becomes 
enlightening in that it identifies lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) 




treating the rights of the LGBTQ community as superior to religious liberty—the first freedom—
and suggests that the threat of establishment today comes not from the Christian churches, but 
from the pro-LGBTQ secular ideology that seeks to demote religious freedom on the grounds 
that “error has no rights” (Farr 2013).  This may explain the impulse felt by American 
conservatives to defend the religious liberty of an apparently besieged Christianity via state-level 
legislative campaigns since the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges (2015) last summer.  While advocates of the RFPT adamantly deny charges of pro-
Christian bias in IRFA, many of the advocates of domestic-level religious freedom legislation 
drop the pretext altogether, suggesting that the legalization of gay marriage that came with 
Obergefell should be viewed as an assault on religious liberty.  Farr (2013) even points to the 
case of a New Mexico-based photographer, arguing that the company should not have been 
penalized for its refusal to provide services at an LGBTQ wedding.  Of course, photographers 
and cake-bakers are the go-to victims for conservative politicians in the U.S., so their businesses 
are exactly what these new state-level religious freedom bills are allegedly designed to protect 
(Merritt 2016).  The problem, as hinted at in Chapter 3, is that the LGBTQ community has a 
putative right to religious freedom (DeLaet and Caufield 2008) as well, which ultimately renders 
the government’s intervention at the limits of tolerance an exercise in interfaith theological 
arbitration.  The problem for IRFA discourse then, is that the state-level debate over religious 
freedom functions to undermine claims that international religious freedom advocacy isn’t biased 
towards Christianity. 
A second problem comes to mind though.  Defining religion in accordance with religious 
freedom policy is inherently a political task with political consequences (see Bosco 2009).  As 




notion of “bad” religion (e.g., Blair 2011; Kerry 2014) that allows governments to discipline 
groups that fail to conform to social norms.  To paraphrase Daniel Brunstetter (2010: 419), 
disciplining “bad” religions is a statement about their lack of agency, because their failure to 
conform to the standards of the majority, however tolerant it may purport to be, can be viewed as 
a threat to civilization itself (also see Brown 2008).  In the case of state-level religious freedom 
policies, the LGBTQ community and the progressive churches that open their doors to 
individuals identifying as LGBTQ are the subjects of this disciplining effort.
27
  Abroad, the 
targets of the “bad” religion narrative take different shapes.  For example, Hurd (2013) notes a 
State Department report from 2010 that praised the Central African Republic for generally 
adhering to the principle of religious freedom.  Yet, at the same time, as many as 60% of the 
women imprisoned throughout the nation were being held on charges of “witchcraft.”  Hurd 
alleges that such offenses are easily disregarded by policymakers that view African Traditional 
Religions (ATRs) as “superstitions,” rather than legitimate “religions” sanctioned for state 
protection, demonstrating that, like the LGBTQ community in the U.S., ATRs in Congo exist at 
the frontiers of tolerance. 
Wither International Religious Freedom? 
Religious freedom stands out as an important human right, particularly for those living in 
the West.  Whether or not the tremendous benefits ascribed to religious freedom by proponents 
of the RFPT can manifest outside of the West has not been shown.  At least, where domestic 
terrorism is concerned, this thesis demonstrates that religious freedom does not reduce political 
violence.  As a result, the argument laid out in this chapter attempts to problematize the RFPT by 
taking its potential normative implications into consideration.  If nothing else, the preceding 




the dangers and disciplining effects of religious freedom advocacy seriously.  In this regard, I 
have focused primarily on the neocolonial or neo-imperial implications of the RFPT, and have 
shown that human rights advocacy and tolerance are non-neutral practices often associated with 
militant humanitarianism or liberal imperialism.  Of course, this is a particularly pressing 
concern since the empirical evidence provides no support for the idea that religious freedom 
reduces political violence in the non-West, and because religious freedom is a Western construct.  
Criticisms of cultural imperialism emanating from scholars critical of the religious freedom 
research agenda and foreign audiences (Cozad 2005; Danchin 2010a; 2010b; Hurd 2010; 2013; 
2015; Sharkey 2008; Sullivan 2010) are thus not without merit. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that religious persecution is somehow desirable, nor is it to 
suggest that the religious freedom research agenda be abandoned altogether.  Further empirical 
analysis is still required to determine if the church-state relationship can account for the 
ambivalence of religion in other spheres of life.  I only focus on domestic terrorism because this 
subject remains understudied in the terrorism studies literature.   Instead, I am suggesting a 
greater reflexive appreciation for one’s place in the world, and the impact that one’s research can 
have on the world (Steele 2010).  There will be unforeseen consequences—potentially good and 
bad—with most major policy projects, so the dangers of IRFA should not simply be disregarded 
or brushed under the metaphorical rug.  Instead, policymakers and scholars attached to the RFPT 
should work to compensate for these problems when they materialize, even if doing so will 
require critical self-interrogation of one’s partisan positions regarding deviants pushed by society 
to the outer limits of social acceptability. 
The RFPT can avoid the trap of cultural relativism by following the advice of the late-




cultural differences can be universally evaluated simply by asking if a practice promotes or 
harms the welfare of the people it affects.  The RFPT certainly has a head start by challenging 
religious persecution, and it has moved further in this direction by emphasizing international 
agreement on the various human rights norms articulated in several United Nations’ declarations 
(Farr and Hoover 2009), but in proposing religious freedom as their solution to the world’s ills, 
advocates of the RFPT must also ask if and how their proposals could cause harm in the very 
societies they seek to help.  This chapter only represents a first attempt to explore this problem. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 In addition to its limited focus on domestic terrorism, some scholars may object to a few 
other problems stemming from this study.  First, this study is limited in its temporal scope to a 
single decade.  Expanding the range of data could help determine if the results in this study are 
robust, though the exhaustive nature of the analysis in Chapter 5 may render such an attempt 
superfluous.  However, there are other data limitations that could present a more serious 
problem.  Namely, a minor risk of omitted variable bias is present.  CFS (2009) include the GINI 
coefficient as a measure for income inequality in their study, but GINI data are very sparse for 
the nations of Asia and Africa in the period under study.  Further research might also want to 
explore the impact of alternative measures of democracy.  As noted in Chapter 4, Vreeland’s X-
POLITY variable removes the problem of instability from the calculus of a state’s democracy 
score.  Perhaps most serious though, is the lack of focus on religious terrorism. 
 One cannot easily code the ideology of an attacker using data from the RDWTI (2016), 
and while the GDT does make it possible to take ideology into consideration, a problem resulting 
from the recoding of this data (into the country-year unit of analysis) led to gross 




terrorist attacks, even if it effect is not strong enough to carry over into the entire universe.  The 
neo-Weberian approach to religious violence requires that this possibility be explored, but given 
these practical limitations, this project has been saved for future research.  It is also worth noting 
the possibility that this research may very well replicate the findings in Chapter 5 from the outset 
though, especially given recent scholarship that casts doubt on the nature of religious violence in 
general and religious terrorism in particular (Armstrong 2014; Cavanaugh 2009; Gunning and 
Jackson 2011; Klein 2015; Piazza 2009). 
 There are, of course, several possible avenues for further exploration, and another data 
problem represents one area where research is desperately needed.  Specifically, the religious 
freedom data in this study are dichotomous in nature, though as outlined in Chapter 3, religious 
freedom is not an either/or kind of proposition.  Proponents of the RFPT may therefore rightly 
object to my analysis, so it is essential to develop a better measure of religious freedom and the 
church-state relationship.  TPS (2011) conceptualize religious freedom as existing on a four-
point spectrum ranging from what might be described as U.S.-style religious freedom to Soviet-
style religious regulation.  Their typology of church-state relationships, that is, is based on two 
factors: 1) the degree of consensus between religious and political actors; and 2) the degree of 
independence between their institutions.  This yields four different ways to classify a state’s 
religious regime based on consensual independence (I), conflictual independence (II), consensual 
integration (III), and conflictual integration (IV).  If their typology could be developed into a 
categorical measure of religious freedom, a range of new hypotheses would open to researchers 
(TPS 2009: 31-44).  A thorough qualitative content analysis of the State Department’s religious 
freedom reports could produce a time-series, cross-national dataset based on TPS’s (2011) 




One might also think more seriously about the problem of temporal dependence plaguing 
the data from the RDWTI (2016).  Although this could be an artifact of the RAND Corporation’s 
dataset since it did not materialize in Berkebile’s (2015) GTD data, it’s possible that there’s 
something more interesting at work.  Organizational learning through time could represent a 
possible explanation.  The typologies of terrorism that try to predict the scale of an attack’s 
violence based on a terrorist’s ideology perceive religious terrorism as the most violent 
(Hoffman 2006; Piazza 2009).  Religiously motivated violence is also said to dominate the 
present wave of terrorist violence, which begs the question of whether or not violence could be 
escalating through time as a result of organizational learning rather than ideology.  If learning is 
taking place, the fact that religious terrorism is perceived as the most deadly could be based on 
spurious assumptions, and the next wave of terrorist violence could actually be even more 
deadly, regardless of the perpetrators’ ideologies.  Interestingly, Piazza (2009) suggests that 
terror groups become more sophisticated through trial and error, leading to a greater number of 
fatalities, and finally, Hoffman’s (2006) own discussion of internationalization points out the 
ways terror groups sought out the PLO for learning purposes.
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Although the findings in this study were not promising, it is too early to write the epitaph 
for the RFPT.  Still, it is only by thoroughly exploring these possibilities that we can determine if 














 The image, by Charles Porter IV (1995), can be accessed from the Pulitzer homepage: 
http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/charles-porter-iv. 
2
 I use the terms homegrown and domestic synonymously. 
3
 Before the Paris attacks, Nate Silver (2015), the statistician behind FiveThirtyEight that was able to correctly 
project the winner of the presidential election in 49/50 states in 2008, and who accurately predicted all 50 in 2012, 
consistently dismissed Trump’s odds of successfully clenching the Republican nomination.  The betting markets 
were similarly bearish on his chances, though a string of primary victories have vaulted him to front-runner status, 
with former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich (2016) describing the businessman as the 
party’s presumptive nominee (also see Neyfakh 2016). 
4
 This is evident in The Epic of Gilgamesh (George 2003), one of the world’s oldest surviving works of literature.  
The Sumerian poem chronicles the adventures of King Gilgamesh, ruler of Uruk, an ancient city-state located in 
modern-day Iraq.  Fearful of his own mortality, Gilgamesh sets out on a quest to live forever.  Only his failure to 
successfully achieve immortality leads him to recognize the value of his most significant accomplishment: the 
construction of the city’s formidable walls designed specifically to protect the people of Uruk from nomadic 
outsiders.  It’s possible that capitalizing on this fear of the outsider in the wake of a terror campaign represents such 
a successful political strategy—particularly for conservatives—because the human fear response is biologically 
hardwired into our DNA, a product of the species’ evolutionary survival needs.  Since the amygdala is responsible 
for detecting and alerting the brain to potential threats—and since conservatives tend to have larger amygdalae—our 
capacity for rational thought can be overcome by the fight or flight instinct until such a threat has passed.  
Perceptions of fear and threat could then impact an individual’s voting decisions.  In other words, fear works (Kanai, 
et al. 2011; also see Bever 2015; Hazen 2014). 
5
 At present, I am only aware of two attempts to empirically evaluate the RFPT (see Grim and Finke 2011; 
Muchlinski 2014).  I presented an earlier incarnation of this thesis as a paper at the annual meeting of the Society for 
the Scientific Study of Religion in 2015 that may serve as a third example (see Herrington 2015). 
6
 A black and white worldview is generally consistent with Islamic theology’s standard division of the world.  First, 
dar al-Islam, or the land of Islam, is the region of the world recognized as being legitimately governed by Islamic 
law (sharia) and the umma (or the community of all believers).  Dar al-Harb, by contrast, is referred to as the 
territory of war, a region of the world ignorant of the tenets of Islam (Armstrong 2002).  Generally, this view finds 
its scriptural basis in the very first sūra of the Holy Qur’an, “The Exordium.”  In this short passage, the Qur’an 
identifies three important agents: God, the friends of God, and the enemies of God.  God’s friends and enemies—
believers and unbelievers, respectively—therefore come to represent the basis of human society (Cook 2000; 
Dawood 2014; note that where the Qur’an is cited, I am referring exclusively to Dawood’s English translation).  
Yet, a third “territory” is also said to exist by some theologians.  Dar al-Sulh represents the territory of treaty, 
nations friendly to or at peace with the Islamic World (Esposito 2004).  This is one area where ISIS departs from 
traditional Islamic theology; the insurgency’s understanding of the gray zone is clearly at odds with this 
understanding of the world of treaty.  
7
 Religion is a challenging, even controversial, concept, and I have dealt with it at length elsewhere (see Herrington 
2012).  Since my focus in this thesis is on religious freedom and not on religion per se, I do not explicitly define the 
concept, and instead follow religious studies scholar W. Richard Comstock (1984: 499) who observes that 
“Augustine’s famous observation about time applies with equal force to religion; if not asked, we know what it is; if 
asked, we do not know.”  Although one cannot reasonably rely on everyone to understand what religion actually is 
(Hurd 2015), I trust that my readers will follow the discussion so long as I do not complicate matters with the kind 
of burdensome epistemological exercise defining the term would require. 
8
 Joseph K. Young and Michael G. Findley (2011), for example, maintain that the identity of the victim is 
inconsequential (also see Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009). 
9
 Interestingly, the RDWTI (2016), which covers a similar time period, does not record a single terrorist attack as 










 Related studies consider whether or not the clash of civilizations contributes to terrorist groups’ public approval 
ratings by looking at individuals’ decisions to support them, but these studies do not really attempt to elucidate a 
causal connection between the clash and actual acts of political violence (see, for instance, Tessler and Robins 2007; 
and Zhirkov, Verkuyten, and Weesie 2013). 
11
 I use the terms international and transnational synonymously. 
12
 Though CFS suggest that the diversity dividend mitigates international terrorism, they do not provide a 
theoretically satisfying reason to expect domestic cultural diversity to impact transnational terror inflows.  Data on 
non-state armed groups indicate that ethnically fragmented states are more likely to sponsor transnational terrorism 
to appease minority constituents (San-Akca 2009), but this only hints at a theoretical reason to consider the effect of 
diversity on transnational terrorist outflows.  Geospatial data shows that territorial conflict in Africa is driven by the 
partition of politically salient ethnic groups divided by arbitrary borders.  If similar logic undergirds patterns of 
transnational terrorism, the demographic makeup of a target state could become theoretically relevant (Goemans 
and Schultz forthcoming; also see Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006).  Nevertheless, neither of these possibilities is 
explored by CFS.  Even if they were considered though, their investigation would still require a shift to the directed-
dyad as the unit of analysis. 
13
 This particular point stands out as interesting because research on multiculturalism in the Netherlands suggests 






 As is common in the literature, I use “religious freedom” and “religious liberty” interchangeably.  However, 
“freedom of conscience,” “religious pluralism,” and “religious tolerance,” which are also sometimes treated 
synonymously with “religious liberty” and “religious freedom,” are unique concepts with distinct epistemological 
baggage. 
15
 Unfortunately, these thought-provoking strands of modern religious freedom research reify a myth of religious 
liberty intimately associated with American exceptionalism, possibly legitimizing criticisms of “imperialism” in 
IRFA policy (e.g., Sullivan 2010; Hurd 2010; Danchin 2010a; 2010b). 
16
 It should be noted that Locke was an ardent anti-Catholic.  In the Essay, however, he suggests that simply 
worshiping in the way of the Catholic cannot be regarded as a security threat to the regime.  While he ultimately 
refuses to extend religious freedom to Catholics later in the Essay, as well as in his Letter, that decision is based not 
on the way they worship, but on a principle of reciprocity discussed below, and the loyalty Catholics were believed 
to have shown to a foreign prince: the pope (Locke 1667, 1689; Zagorin 2003). 
17
 Though Colonial Maryland was founded as a haven for Roman Catholics, the Lords Calvert, the colony’s 





 Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir (2015) might question the direction of the causal arrow here.  They find evidence 
that sustained terror campaigns are actually linked to decreases in political tolerance in the case of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  By contrast, Grim and Finke (2011) argue that (religious) tolerance and political violence are 
co-constitutive of one another.  Such is the nature of the feedback loop, they aver, that increases in tolerance will 
lead to reductions in terrorism, while increases in terrorism lead to increases in intolerance, and so on.  For 
analytical reasons, I focus exclusively on the tolerance  violence dimension of the feedback look rather than the 
violence  terrorism aspect. 
19
 In an indirect way, this may explain why some scholars (e.g., Klein 2015; Piazza 2009) have failed to find 
evidence supporting Mia Bloom’s (2005) theory of terrorist outbidding.  While Bloom expects terrorists competing 
for media attention to become more violent in the presence of additional factions, the religious economy approach 
shows that extremist organizations competing in a market place of ideas must, for the sake of survival, moderate.  
Failure to do so will lead to declining membership, and possibly, extinction (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Madison 







 There are 928 country-years rather than 930 (10 × 93) because Timor-Leste did not achieve its independence until 
2002. 
21
 It is important to acknowledge that even Locke’s thought has been shown to have provided the philosophical 
framework for the exclusionary practices of the colonial powers (Mehta 1990). 
22
 Unfortunately, CFS’s (2009) replication data is no longer available. 
23
 CFS (2009) measure terrorism using the average number of domestic and transnational attacks inflicted on a state.  
The averages were calculated from the annual attack totals recorded by the MIPT-TKB.  Based on the definition 










 One could easily add the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to this list.  Not only does the PRC have its own 
conception of religious freedom—one more in line with Locke’s original idea of religious toleration—for groups not 
believed dangerous to national stability, but the Chinese have long been skeptical of attempts to infiltrate the 
mainland with foreign ideas.  Indeed, the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 can be seen as an anti-imperialist 
backlash targeting Western “missionaries, traders and soldiers” (Wert 2011) that still carries influence in the PRC 
today. 
26
 Consider, once more, the Kingdom of Buganda, where the British “flag followed the cross” in an African colonial 
venture.  Philip D. Curtin (2012) observes that Christian missionaries were welcomed in Buganda because they 
brought with them the promise of guns and technical knowledge, ultimately exacerbating the civil war there.  When 
the fighting was put down by the British East Africa Company, the British annexed the territory, establishing the 
Ugandan Protectorate. 
27
 Some may even recall, in the run up to Obergefell, arguments that actually treated gay marriage as if it posed a 
clear and present danger to civilization.  
28
 Comparative research on democratic learning has handled time in a similar manner (Rohrschneider 1999), so 
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Appendix: Data Coding 
My dataset on religious freedom and domestic terrorism (RFDT) records information on 42 variables for 


















































The RFDT dataset records information over a ten year period from 2000 to 2001 for two reasons.  First 
and foremost, the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report was first issued in a 
useable form in 2000, meaning cross-national/time-series data on a state’s religious freedom prior to the 
year 2000 are harder to come by.  Second, the RAND Corporation’s “Database of Worldwide Terrorism 
Incidents” (RDWTI) does not yet extend beyond 2009.  Though the recent inclusion of data from the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) “Global 
Terrorism Database” means that the RFDT dataset could be extended through 2014, this remains an 
objective for future research.  For the meantime, data from the GDT included in the RFDT dataset is 







The RFDT dataset records information for 93 Asian and African countries.  Following Daniel Cox, John 
Falconer, and Brian Stackhouse (2009; hereinafter CFS), the RFDT looks at all Asian and African states 
with a population greater than 1,000,000.  This approach also mirrors the coding procedure used by 
Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min (2009) for their “Ethnic Power Relations” (EPR) 
dataset, though the RFDT dataset does away with their requirement that cases have a surface area 
exceeding 500,000 square kilometers.  The RFDT dataset also includes Middle Eastern countries, which 















14. Central African Republic 
15. Chad 
16. China 
17. Congo, Democratic Republic of the 
18. Congo, Republic of the 



















38. Korea, North 
























63. Palestine/West Bank 




68. Saudi Arabia 
69. Senegal 






73. South Africa 





























7. Equatorial Guinea 
8. Maldives 
9. Qatar 









Religious Freedom (religious_freedom) is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if religious freedom 
exists in a state or 0 if religious freedom is absent.  The variable was coded based on information 
contained in the U.S. State Department’s (2000-2009) extensive International Religious Freedom 
Reports.  As the State Department reports, governments that “generally [respect]” religious freedom are 
those that “[attempt] to protect religious freedom in the fullest sense.”  As a result, the State Department 
treats general respect as the highest level of respect for religious freedom a state may display. 
By and large, states that generally respect religious freedom were thus coded as 1.  However, as 
operationalized in the RFDT dataset, Religious Freedom seeks to capture the way states behave in 
practice, and is less concerned with de facto policy than the State Department may be.  As such, 
exceptions are made to this general rule of thumb.  For example, when the State Department reports that a 
country, like Jordan for instance, has generally respected religious freedom but immediately follows this 
pronouncement with a caveat about persistent abuses, a country can be coded as 0. 
Attempts were made to standardize this coding procedure though.  So, countries seeing significant 
improvements were often coded as 1.  Countries that respect religious freedom are also coded as 1, even if 
state and local governments fail to do so.  This is a levels-of-analysis problem that is worthy of further 
exploration, but violations by local governments do not (for the purpose of the present study) merit a shift 
to 0. 
Where countries have minor violations of religious freedom coupled with de facto policies recognizing 
one religious institution over another, a judgment call was made based on the information reported by the 
State Department. 
Religious Diversity (10%) 
Religious Diversity (10%) (religious_dvrsty10) is a count variable estimating the number of religions in a 
state with 10% or more of a total population.  Estimates were derived from the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (2000-2009; hereinafter CIA) World Factbook by counting the number of religious groups 
believed to represent more than 10% of the population based on the following coding rules: 
First, where data was available, all religious subgroups (e.g., Protestant denominations or Catholics) were 
counted.  If data was unavailable, data was only counted for umbrella groups (e.g., Christianity or Islam). 
Second, atheists were counted when the CIA designated nonbelievers as representing 10% of the 
population or more. 
Third, any religious grouping labeled as “unspecified” was not counted, regardless of the size of its 
population. 
Fourth, when religious groups were listed as “other,” they were only counted if a specific group was listed 
as an example with a population percentage of 10% or more.  If “other” was listed but no groups were 




Finally, if no estimated percentages were included, the groups were not counted. 
Religious Diversity (Total) 
Religious Diversity (Total) (religious_dvrstytot) is a count variable estimating the total number of 
religions active in a state.  Estimates were derived from the CIA’s (2000-2009) World Factbook by 
counting each religious group based on the following coding rules: 
First, where data was available, all religious subgroups were counted separately.  Umbrella groups were 
not counted unless these data were unavailable, in which case the wider umbrella groups were counted 
exclusively. 
Second, atheists were counted when the CIA designated nonbelievers as representing part of the 
population. 
Third, any religious grouping labeled as “unspecified” was not counted. 
Fourth, when religious groups were listed as “other,” they were counted.  If the category of “other” 
included no specific examples, it was counted as 1.  If, on the other hand, specific groups were listed as an 
example, the category of “other” was counted as 2 or more depending on how many such groups were 
identified. 
Finally, if the CIA included a note about the number of groups officially recognized by a government, 
these numbers were only used if they were greater than the number provided. 
Control Variables 
Ethnic Diversity 
Ethnic Diversity (ethnic_dvrsty) is a count variable representing the total number of politically relevant 
ethnic groups reported in the EPR datset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009).  Values for countries with 
surface areas less than 500,000 square kilometers (including Bhutan, Mauritius, and Singapore) were 
taken from a later version of the EPR modified by Manuel Vogt (2014), as were values for Sierra Leon in 
2000 and 2001.  Values for the West Bank are estimates based on the total number of ethnic groups 
reported in the CIA’s World Factbook. 
Population 
Population (population) is taken from the CIA’s (2000-2009) World Factbook, while pop_log is the 
natural log of Population. 
Land Area 
Land Area (area_sqk) is taken from a country’s estimated surface area (sans the water area) as it appears 
in the World Factbook (2001-2009).  Population Density (popdens) is calculated by dividing Population 





GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
States’ GDP data are taken for the gdppcppp variable from the CIA’s World Factbook (2000-2009), while 
log_gdppcppp is the natural log of that variable. 
Democracy 
State’s democracy scores are taken from the Polity IV dataset. 
Region Dummies 
Mena (for the Middle East and North Africa) 
ss_africa (for Sub-Saharan Africa) 
c_asia (for Russia and Central Asia) 
e_asia (for East Asia) 
s_asia (for South Asia) 
se_asia (for Southeast Asia) 
Temporal Dummies 
Temporal dummies (dum2000-dum2009) were included and set equal to one in their respective years. 
Dependent Variables 
Terrorism Data from RAND 
Domestic terrorism data from the RDWTI was used to count the total number of attacks (rattack_tot) 
occurring each year, as well as the total number of injuries (rinjuries), and the total number of fatalities 
(rfatalities) resulting from those attacks each year.  The injury and fatality variables were combined to 
measure the total number of casualties (rcasualities), while a dichotomized variable (rattack_dich) was set 
equal to one if any attack occurred in a given year (and 0 if rattack_tot equaled 0). 
Terrorism Data from START 
Additional data was taken from Richard E. Berkebile’s modified GDT dataset on domestic terrorism. 
Using Berkebile’s dataset, I counted the total number of attacks (gdt_tot) occurring each year, as well as 
the total number of injuries (gdtinjuries), and the total number of fatalities (gdtfatalities) resulting from 
those attacks each year.  The injury and fatality variables were combined to measure the total number of 
casualties (gdtcasualities), while a dichotomized variable (gdt_dich) was set equal to one if any attack 
occurred in a given year (or 0 if gdt_tot equaled 0). 
